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Introduction 
Indian tribes have suffered many defeats at the Supreme Court in the 
twenty-first century. Among others, the Court has limited tribal civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers,1 restricted the application of the Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 * Law Clerk to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts. J.D., 2018, Stanford Law School; B.A., 2013, Harvard 
College. 
First-place winner, American Indian Law Review 2017-2018 Writing Competition. 
 1. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 320 
(2008). 
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Child Welfare Act,2 and diminished federal power to take tribal land into 
trust.3 Overall, tribes lost 82% of cases before the Roberts Court through 
2015.4 
Of all these defeats, the most significant may turn out to be an 
idiosyncratic decision from 2005: City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.5 
This decision was the last of three times the Supreme Court ruled on the 
longstanding land claim of the Oneida Indian Nation (OIN) against New 
York and its municipalities. In the late 1990s, the OIN purchased parcels on 
the open market within the boundaries of its treaty-guaranteed reservation, 
land New York unlawfully purchased from the tribe two centuries earlier.6 
The OIN sought immunity from local property taxation for this land on the 
ground that Congress never extinguished its sovereign authority over the 
area.7 The Court denied the OIN tax immunity based on the length of time 
the OIN failed to exercise sovereignty over the area and the justifiable 
expectations of non-Indian landowners and state and local governments.8 
Sherrill left scholars confused. In addition to criticizing the Court’s 
analysis,9 they wondered how far its reasoning extended. Some thought 
Sherrill’s unique facts involving an open-market purchase of land by a tribe 
within its historic reservation would make it difficult to apply to other 
contexts.10 Others feared courts would adopt the generalizable concerns in 
Sherrill about disruption to non-Indian expectations to deny a wide range of 
tribal claims.11 The Second Circuit’s statement a few months after the 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 641-42 (2013). 
 3. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382 (2009). 
 4. Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: 
Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1901, 1907 (comparing this percentage to the 71% loss rate for tribes during the 
Rehnquist Court). 
 5. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).  
 6. Id. at 211. 
 7. Id. at 211-12. 
 8. Id. at 202-03. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 77-86. 
 10. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 60 ME. 
L. REV. 1, 15 (2008). 
 11. See Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A 
Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 
41 TULSA. L. REV. 5, 10-11 (2005) [hereinafter Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript].  
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decision that Sherrill “dramatically altered the legal landscape” only 
heightened these fears.12 
Courts have been equally confused over the extent to which Sherrill’s 
concerns about disruption to non-Indian expectations should bar tribal 
claims. The Second Circuit, with strong dissents and some pushback from 
district courts, has read Sherrill to require dismissal of all tribal land claims 
regardless of whether the tribe seeks ejectment of current landowners, 
monetary damages, or declaratory relief.13 Courts have split on whether 
Sherrill applies to reservation diminishment and other sovereign treaty 
rights disputes14 or prohibits tribes from asserting sovereign immunity in 
certain cases.15 In opinions on reservation diminishment and the 
constitutionality of the land-to-trust process in the Indian Reorganization 
Act (IRA), Justice Thomas has suggested that he supports a broad 
understanding of Sherrill’s reach.16 Even a tribal court has applied Sherrill 
to bar recovery in a marital property dispute.17 
These disputes over the true meaning of the Sherrill decision have taken 
on even more significance in the past four years as litigants opposing tribal 
interests have advanced new arguments based on Sherrill at the Supreme 
Court. In Nebraska v. Parker, for example, Nebraska argued the Court 
should alter its longstanding reservation diminishment test focused on 
congressional intent to emphasize modern demographics and jurisdictional 
history because of Sherrill’s concerns about disruption to non-Indian 
expectations; an amicus brief in support of Nebraska even proposed that the 
Court find diminishment based solely on non-Indian inhabitance and 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 2005); see also 
Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 11 (citing this statement as “evidence of 
City of Sherrill’s huge potential outside of the taxation context”). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2, II.B.3. 
 15. See infra Section II.B.4. 
 16. See Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States, No. 16-1320, 2017 WL 
5660979, at *2 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denials of certiorari) 
(citing Sherrill to argue that taking 13,000 acres of OIN land into trust would burden state 
and local governments and harm neighboring landowners); Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 
1072, 1082 (2016) (“[W]e express no view about whether equitable considerations of laches 
and acquiescence may curtail the Tribe's power to tax the retailers of Pender in light of the 
Tribe's century-long absence from the disputed lands.” (citing City of Sherrill v. Oneida 
Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217-21 (2005))). 
 17. See Smith v. Watty, 6 Cherokee Rep. 31, 31-32 (E. Cherokee Ct. 2007) (using 
Sherill to apply laches as a bar to a woman seeking distribution of her interests in marital 
property because she made her motion twenty-five years after her divorce and fifteen years 
after the end of activity in her divorce case). 
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regulation of the reservation, regardless of congressional intent.18 During 
the October 2017 term, the Court granted certiorari in United States v. 
Washington, a dispute between a number of tribes, joined by the federal 
government, and Washington over whether the state is violating tribal treaty 
fishing rights by maintaining culverts that prevent the movement of fish.19 
Echoing the position of seven Ninth Circuit judges dissenting from the 
court’s decision not to rehear the case en banc, Washington argued that the 
panel erred in declining to adjudicate its waiver and estoppel defenses 
because Sherrill held that equitable defenses can apply to Indian treaty 
rights and thus abrogated circuit precedent to the contrary.20 These recent, 
broad arguments based on Sherrill that litigants have proposed to the 
Supreme Court make it important to determine whether Sherrill reaches as 
far as they suggest. 
Sherrill is a confusing decision because it does not fit in any doctrinal 
category within federal Indian law.21 Although the OIN was attempting to 
assert sovereign authority within its reservation, the Court explicitly noted 
that Sherrill did not address reservation diminishment.22 The OIN’s suit 
sought tax immunity, but the Court did not cite its jurisprudence on the 
ability of state and local governments to tax tribes. The Court did not 
discuss tribal sovereign immunity, despite the obvious question of whether 
courts could force the OIN to pay property taxes. Given this avoidance of 
traditional doctrinal analysis, it is easy to dismiss Sherrill as inapplicable 
beyond its unique facts. 
But Sherrill’s amorphous nature creates the risk of exactly what some 
courts have done with it: denying a broad range of tribal claims to avoid 
disrupting non-Indian expectations with “dormant” tribal rights. Many 
tribes could not exercise their legal rights for many years for a number of 
reasons, including a lack of resources, barriers in access to the court system, 
and the attempts of federal, state, and local governments to deny tribes their 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See infra notes 296-97. 
 19. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 968 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018). 
 20. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25-28, Washington, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (No. 17-
269); see also United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(O’Scannlain, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Sherrill made clear that laches 
can apply to Indian treaty rights . . . .”), aff’d by an equally divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 
(2018). 
 21. See Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 10. 
 22. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 215 n.9 (2005). 
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rights.23 In some sense then, non-Indians have developed expectations that 
tribes simply do not exist. By prioritizing non-Indian expectations, Sherrill 
provides a potential basis for a doctrine that prohibits tribes from exercising 
their legal rights in any capacity. This understanding of Sherrill could 
create a simple rule in federal Indian law: tribes lose. 
This reading of Sherrill is unwarranted. Sherrill does not require courts 
to always prioritize preventing disruption to non-Indian expectations over 
tribal rights. Courts applying Sherrill this broadly have ignored key aspects 
of the decision. In the request by the OIN for tax immunity, the Court was 
confronted with a unique, forward-looking remedy seeking a revival of 
sovereignty in a tribal land claim, in contrast to the standard tribal request 
for damages in such actions.24 This remedy concerned the Court because of 
the risk of prospective disruption to non-Indians, as well as state and local 
governments, two centuries after the unlawful dispossession of the land.25 
The Court did not address the underlying right, other non-disruptive 
remedies for tribal land claims, or other types of disputes. This more 
faithful and limited reading of Sherrill demonstrates that concerns about 
disruption to non-Indian expectations should not bar damages and 
declaratory remedies for tribal land claims.26 Courts faithfully applying 
Sherrill should also decline to utilize its disruption framework in disputes 
about reservation diminishment, other tribal treaty rights, or sovereign 
immunity. Those cases involve assertions of tribal sovereignty as the 
essence of the tribal claim or defense, not solely as the remedy, and 
concerns about disruption are not as acute in these contexts.27 Only when 
tribes seek to assert sovereignty as a remedy in a land claim should courts 
apply Sherrill’s disruption analysis. 
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the OIN 
land claim and a summary of the Sherrill decision. Part II explores how 
lower courts have applied Sherrill in a range of cases involving Indian 
tribes, including tribal land claims and sovereignty disputes. Part III closely 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See, e.g., id. at 205-06 (describing the policy of the federal government during the 
1800s of removing tribes from their ancestral lands); Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of 
the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 615-27 (2006) 
(noting many legal and practical obstacles the OIN and other tribes faced in bringing 
lawsuits to vindicate their tribal land rights). 
 24. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226, 229 
(1985). 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Section IV.A. 
 27. See infra Section IV.B. 
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analyzes Sherrill to demonstrate that it only applies to tribal land claims and 
only bars certain remedies in those cases. Part IV utilizes this understanding 
of Sherrill to explain how lower courts have applied the decision well 
beyond its limits. 
I. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation  
Before the arrival of European colonists, the Oneidas inhabited 
approximately six million acres in New York.28 Under pressure to open 
land for white settlers, New York entered into the Treaty of Fort Schuyler 
with the Oneidas in 1788 to acquire all but three hundred thousand acres of 
Oneida land.29 Two years later, Congress passed the Nonintercourse Act, 
which prohibited sales of tribal land without federal permission.30 In 1794, 
the United States and six tribes in New York (the Haudenosaunee) signed 
the Treaty of Canandaigua, which guaranteed the Oneidas use of their 
reservation.31 Ignoring the Nonintercourse Act and this treaty, New York 
continued purchasing land from the Oneidas without federal approval.32 
Most significantly, in 1795, New York bought one hundred thousand acres 
of the Oneida reservation.33 Although the federal government initially 
objected to these transfers, it began to encourage them as part of “a policy 
designed to open reservation lands to white settlers and to remove tribes 
westward.”34 In 1838, the Oneidas and the United States signed the Treaty 
of Buffalo Creek, which permitted the removal of tribal members remaining 
in New York to Kansas.35 By then, New York had purchased all but five 
thousand acres of the Oneida reservation.36 Over the next eighty years, the 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 203. For the sake of clarity, I use “OIN” to refer to the modern 
federally recognized tribe that brought the land claim and “Oneidas” to refer to the tribe that 
resided in New York before the arrival of European colonists. See, e.g., Oneida Indian 
Nation v. Madison County, 665 F.3d 408, 415 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 29. Treaty of Fort Schuyler, N.Y.-Oneida, Sept. 22, 1788, reprinted in 2 PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, APPOINTED BY LAW FOR THE EXTINGUISHMENT 
OF INDIAN TITLES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 241 (Franklin B. Hough ed., Albany, N.Y., 
Joel Munsell 1861), https://archive.org/details/proceedingsofcom01newy/page/n263; 
Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 203. 
 30. Indian Nonintercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138; Sherrill, 544 U.S. 
at 204. 
 31. Treaty of Canandaigua, art. 2, 7 Stat. 44, 45 (1794); Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 204-05. 
 32. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 205. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Treaty of Buffalo Creek, art. 2, 7 Stat. 550, 551 (1838); Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 206. 
 36. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 206. 
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Oneida land holdings in New York dwindled to only thirty-two acres by 
1920.37 
In 1970, the OIN instituted a test case against Oneida and Madison 
Counties in New York. The suit alleged that the 1795 sale of one hundred 
thousand acres to New York “violated the Nonintercourse Act and thus did 
not terminate the [OIN’s] right to possession”; the OIN sought damages for 
the fair rental value for 1968 and 1969 of the 872 acres of land the counties 
owned.38 The OIN land claim took a long, tortured road through the federal 
courts over forty-one years, reaching the Supreme Court three times.39 The 
Supreme Court held in Oneida I that the suit raised a federal question for 
the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction.40 Eleven years later, the Court 
determined in Oneida II that the OIN had a private right of action under 
federal common law for the unlawful dispossession of its lands and rejected 
a number of defenses that might have barred a damages award.41 The Court 
declined to decide whether laches barred the OIN’s claim because the 
counties failed to raise the issue at the Second Circuit; it strongly suggested, 
however, that laches would not apply because, among other reasons, the 
“application of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be 
novel.”42 The Court left open the question of “whether equitable 
considerations should limit the relief available” to the tribe.43 Writing for 
four dissenting justices, Justice Stevens asserted that he would have reached 
the laches question and barred the claim due to the unjustified delay of over 
175 years before the OIN brought suit.44 On remand, the district court 
awarded the OIN approximately $35,000 plus prejudgment interest.45 
In an attempt to reconstitute its reservation in the late 1990s, the OIN 
repurchased on the open market some of the land it sold to New York two 
centuries earlier.46 The City of Sherrill (“the City”) attempted to collect 
property taxes from the OIN for the parcels within its borders.47 When the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 207.  
 38. Id. at 208.  
 39. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197; Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Oneida Indian Nation v. 
County of Oneida (Oneida I), 414 U.S. 661 (1974). 
 40. 414 U.S. at 675. 
 41. 470 U.S. at 233-36, 240-50. 
 42. Id. at 244-45, 244 n.16. 
 43. Id. at 253 n.27. 
 44. Id. at 255-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 45. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 217 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
 46. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211 (2005). 
 47. See id. 
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OIN argued that its sovereign authority over the parcels exempted them 
from state and local taxation, the City initiated eviction proceedings.48 In 
response, the OIN filed an action in the Northern District of New York to 
enjoin the proceedings.49 Both the district court and the Second Circuit 
analyzed whether the repurchased parcels were Indian Country and thus 
exempt from state and local taxation.50 The district court held that the 1794 
Treaty of Canandaigua created the Oneida Reservation and that no 
congressional act, including the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, 
disestablished it; therefore, the parcels were in Indian Country and not 
subject to local taxation.51 The Second Circuit affirmed.52 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on four questions relating to whether the parcels 
were Indian Country.53 
In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court reversed on 
grounds distinct from the Indian Country questions on which it granted 
certiorari.54 The Court did not disturb the Second Circuit’s holding that the 
parcels were within the undiminished Oneida Reservation.55 Instead, asking 
whether the OIN could assert sovereignty over the parcels after it “unified 
fee and aboriginal title” through open market purchases, the Court held that 
“‘standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice’ preclude[d] 
the Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.”56 
Recognizing the distinction between rights and remedies, the Court 
acknowledged that the OIN had a cause of action for damages for unlawful 
dispossession from Oneida II.57 But it determined that the relief the OIN 
sought here, the ability to assert tax immunity for the parcels, was 
unavailable due to the two centuries of state sovereign control, the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 211-12. 
 50. Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2003); Oneida 
Indian Nation v. City of Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226, 241 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 51. Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 254. 
 52. Sherrill, 337 F.3d at 167.  
 53. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 542 U.S. 936 (2004) (granting the 
City’s writ of certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197 (No. 03-
855) (listing the four questions presented for review). 
 54. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 212, 214 n.8 (acknowledging that it “resolv[ed] this case on 
considerations not discretely identified in the parties’ briefs,” but determining that the issue 
it addressed was “inextricably linked to, and [was] thus ‘fairly included’ within, the 
questions presented” (quoting SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a))). 
 55. See id. at 215 n.9. 
 56. Id. at 213-14 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61, 90 
(N.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
 57. See id. at 213. 
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significant increase in the parcels’ value over that period, and the delay of 
the OIN in asserting its sovereignty.58 It also emphasized the “justifiable 
expectations” of the current non-Indian landowners regarding New York’s 
continuing regulatory authority.59 According to the Court, “[t]his long lapse 
of time, during which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their sovereign 
control through equitable relief in court, and the attendant dramatic changes 
in the character of the properties, preclude[d] OIN from gaining the 
disruptive remedy it [sought].”60 
The Court relied on three equitable doctrines to support its holding: 
laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.61 First, the Court stated that a “long 
lapse of time . . . can preclude relief” and that laches “may bar long-
dormant claims for equitable relief.”62 The Court noted that it had 
previously applied “laches in Felix v. Patrick to bar the heirs of an Indian 
from establishing a constructive trust over land their Indian ancestor had 
conveyed in violation of a statutory restriction.”63 According to the Court, 
the heirs were barred because the land had been sold to other owners, 
incorporated into a major city, and was worth significantly more than when 
the Indian received the land.64 The Court thought the OIN suit implicated 
the same “sort of changes to the value and character of the land . . . in even 
greater magnitude.”65 
Second, the Court analogized to the doctrine of acquiescence in interstate 
boundary disputes. The Court recognized that “[l]ong acquiescence in the 
possession of territory and the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over it 
may have a controlling effect in the determination of a disputed boundary,” 
regardless of the “original validity of a boundary line.”66 The Court 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See id. at 214-15. In a concurrence, Justice Souter argued that these considerations 
defeated not only the remedy the OIN sought, but also their right. See id. at 222 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (“The Tribe’s inaction cannot . . . be ignored here as affecting only a remedy to 
be considered later; it is, rather, central to the very claims of right made by the contending 
parties.”). 
 59. See id. at 215-16. 
 60. Id. at 216-17; see also id. at 215 n.9 (“The relief OIN seeks . . . is unavailable 
because of the long lapse of time, during which New York’s governance remained 
undisturbed, and the present-day and future disruption such relief would engender.”).  
 61. Id. at 221. 
 62. Id. at 216-17. 
 63. Id. at 217 (citation omitted). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 218 (citing Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 651 (1973); Massachusetts v. 
New York, 271 U.S. 65, 95 (1926)). 
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therefore reasoned that “[w]hen a party belatedly asserts a right to present 
and future sovereign control over territory, longstanding observances and 
settled expectations are prime considerations.”67 Since the OIN had not 
exercised sovereignty in the area for two centuries, permitting them to 
reassert sovereignty one parcel at a time “would dishonor ‘the historic 
wisdom in the value of repose.’”68 
Third, the Court emphasized “the impracticability of returning to Indian 
control land that generations earlier passed into numerous private hands.”69 
Rejecting the argument that the impossibility doctrine did not apply because 
the OIN did not seek to eject landowners, the Court feared that “the 
unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian sovereign control . . . 
would have disruptive practical consequences.”70 With an Indian population 
in Sherrill of less than 1%, the “checkerboard of alternating state and tribal 
jurisdiction . . . would ‘seriously burde[n] the administration of state and 
local governments’ and would adversely affect landowners neighboring the 
tribal patches.”71 The Court expressed special concern about the OIN 
seeking zoning exemptions.72 
Justice Stevens dissented alone.73 He thought the majority did “what only 
Congress may do” by “effectively proclaim[ing] a diminishment of the 
Tribe’s reservation and an abrogation of its elemental right to tax 
immunity.”74 He also found it nonsensical as a matter of equity to hold that 
non-Indian reliance interests barred tribal tax immunity but not Oneida II’s 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 218-19 (quoting Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 262 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 69. Id. at 219. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 211, 219-20 (alteration in original) (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 
(1994)).  
 72. Id. at 220 (“If OIN may unilaterally reassert sovereign control and remove these 
parcels from the local tax rolls, little would prevent the Tribe from initiating a new 
generation of litigation to free the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory controls that 
protect all landowners in the area.”). The Court cited two pending tribal suits seeking to 
exempt repurchased land from zoning laws. See id. at 220 n.13 (citing Seneca-Cayuga 
Tribe v. Town of Aurelius, No. 5:03-CV-00690 (NPM), 2004 WL 1945359, at *1-3 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2004); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Village of Union Springs, 317 F. Supp. 
2d 128, 131-34, 147-48 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 73. His dissent was especially notable given his position in Oneida II that laches barred 
the OIN’s claim for damages. See supra text accompanying note 44; see also Sherrill, 544 
U.S. at 221 n.14 (“Justice STEVENS, after vigorously urging the application of laches to 
block further proceedings in Oneida II, now faults the Court for rejecting the claim 
presented here.” (citation omitted)). 
 74. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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damages remedy.75 Finally, he criticized the majority for relying on 
concerns about future zoning disputes not at issue in the case.76  
Scholars have criticized Sherrill on numerous fronts. On doctrinal 
grounds, some questioned the Court’s focus on laches because it did not 
apply the traditional laches test of unreasonable delay and prejudice.77 If it 
had done so, it would have recognized the efforts of the OIN to assert its 
rights despite numerous legal, political, and economic barriers.78 Others 
noted that the Court’s worries about checkerboard jurisdiction emerged 
only because of its jurisprudence on state and tribal authority in Indian 
Country.79 Yet more found unpersuasive the notion that granting the OIN 
tax immunity would be disruptive.80 Property scholars were skeptical about 
the Court’s desire to protect the expectations of non-Indian landowners 
whose title derived from an unlawful dispossession.81 They also criticized 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See id. at 226. 
 76. Id. at 222, 226. If such considerations were relevant, Justice Stevens thought the 
majority exaggerated the risk of excessive tribal powers, noting that New York’s strong 
interest would permit it to continue applying zoning ordinances to the OIN parcels and that 
the OIN could not tax or otherwise regulate non-Indian lands within their reservation. See id. 
at 226 n.6.  
 77. See, e.g., Curtis Berkey, Recent Development, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 373, 378 (2005-2006). Additionally, as Justice Stevens’ 
dissent noted, the City likely waived these equitable defenses. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 225 
n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sarah Krakoff, The Renaissance of Tribal Sovereignty, the 
Negative Doctrinal Feedback Loop, and the Rise of a New Exceptionalism, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 47, 54 (2005) [hereinafter Krakoff, Renaissance]. 
 78. See, e.g., Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 14-15 (arguing that the 
Tribe did not delay in pursuing its claims because it brought suit against the United States in 
1893 and 1951 when the United States waived its sovereign immunity and that it could not 
sue in New York state courts without statutory authorization); Singer, supra note 23, at 615-
27 (noting many legal and practical obstacles that prevented the OIN from suing to 
invalidate New York’s land purchase, including the difficulty of finding and paying a 
lawyer, the inability of tribes to sue in state and federal courts without congressional 
authorization, state sovereign immunity, and uncertainty over whether the tribe had a private 
right of action raising a federal question). 
 79. See, e.g., Joshua L. Sohn, Note and Comment, The Double-Edged Sword of Indian 
Gaming, 42 TULSA L. REV. 139, 163-64 (2006). 
 80. See, e.g., Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that the 
Counties only had to slightly adjust their property tax system to make up for the lost revenue 
and that the OIN partially compensated local governments for lost revenue); Ezra Rosser, 
Protecting Non-Indians from Harm? The Property Consequences of Indians, 87 OR. L. REV. 
175, 196, 210-11 (2008) (demonstrating that proximity to a reservation does not make land 
less valuable and arguing that because land would be worth more to a tax-exempt tribe, 
landowners could sell property to the tribe at a premium). 
 81. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 23, at 610. 
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the decision for leaving the OIN with title to the land but no associated 
rights and, conversely, leaving non-Indians with all the property rights 
associated with ownership without formal title.82 Some believed that 
Sherrill’s reasoning conflicted with the Nonintercourse Act, which made 
New York’s land purchase invalid both in law and equity.83 Others noted 
that the decision presumed a strange notion of sovereignty that fades with 
time.84  
Scholars also criticized Sherrill on policy grounds. The decision 
seemingly defied recent federal policy supporting tribal independence and 
sovereignty.85 In doing so, some thought it usurped the role of Congress in 
managing tribal-state relations, even though Congress never indicated 
concern about the settled expectations the Court purported to protect.86 The 
Court’s decision also permitted New York to avoid the consequences of its 
misconduct simply because a significant period of time had passed.87 The 
only scholarly defense of Sherrill argued that, due to the difficulty of 
adjudicating historical facts, the Court was right to maintain the status quo 
and leave what were ultimately policy issues to the political branches.88 
In the thirteen years since the decision, the Supreme Court has not 
responded to these criticisms, nor has it explained Sherrill’s holding any 
further. In fact, the justices have cited Sherrill only four times. Two of these 
citations were for matters of Supreme Court procedure.89 The other two 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See, e.g., id. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 608-09. 
 84. See Krakoff, Renaissance, supra note 77, at 54. 
 85. See Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 6, 18. 
 86. See, e.g., Seth Davis, Tribal Rights of Action, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 499, 
550 (2014).  
 87. See, e.g., Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 6 (“[T]he Court is 
embracing an apologist stand toward the many instances of immoral and illegal 
governmental actions against the tribe, and ultimately suggesting that the passage of time 
renders that history irrelevant, indeed even unmentionable.”); Wenona T. Singel & Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21, 45 (2005) 
(arguing that Sherrill condoned the behavior of those who have “used physical and political 
power to dispossess Indian[s] . . . of their lands”).  
 88. See Availability of Equitable Relief, 119 HARV. L. REV. 347, 354-56 (2005). But see 
Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 11 (arguing that the decision “puts the 
Court in the role of moral arbiter” by “weighing in on one side of the historical ledger”); 
Singer, supra note 23, at 628-29 (arguing that the Court should have ruled for the OIN and 
then permitted Congress to figure out how to balance the interests of the OIN and the non-
Indian possessors). 
 89. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173 n.1 (2009); Medellin v. 
Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 685 n.2 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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brief citations by Justice Thomas suggested that he believes Sherrill’s 
concerns about disruption to non-Indian settled expectations could bar tribal 
rights beyond the narrow context of land claim litigation.90 
II. Applications of Sherrill in the Lower Courts 
Despite substantial criticism, Sherrill remains good law, and the decision 
itself is almost all we can utilize to determine its scope. The question then 
becomes what lower courts should do with the decision. This Part explores 
how lower courts have evaluated Sherrill’s scope. First, although the 
Second Circuit has encountered some pushback, it has derived a rule from 
Sherrill barring all tribal land claims regardless of the remedy the tribe 
seeks.91 Second, courts are split on Sherrill’s application to disputes 
involving tribal sovereignty, including reservation diminishment claims,92 
suits involving other treaty rights,93 and claims of tribal sovereign immunity 
from suit.94 As is evident from these lower court decisions, no consensus 
has developed on the reach of the Sherrill decision. 
A. Tribal Land Claims 
1. The Second Circuit’s Inherent Disruption Rule 
Sherrill’s greatest impact has been in tribal land claims in the Second 
Circuit. Despite adjudicating tribal land claims since the 1970s,95 the 
Second Circuit has read Sherrill to bar these claims completely. As the 
court stated in 2014, “it is now well-established that Indian land claims 
asserted generations after an alleged dispossession are inherently disruptive 
of state and local governance and the settled expectations of current 
landowners, and are subject to dismissal on the basis of laches, 
acquiescence, and impossibility.”96 The court has been inconsistent in 
articulating its rule,97 but its application seems to bar all tribal land claims.98 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See supra note 16. 
 91. See infra Section II.A. 
 92. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 93. See infra Section II.B.3. 
 94. See infra Section II.B.4. 
 95. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 208 (2005) (noting that 
the OIN filed its test case against Oneida and Madison Counties in 1970). 
 96. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 97. Initially, the court articulated a two-step test, first asking whether Sherrill applied to 
the claim and then analyzing whether the factors from Sherrill supported dismissal. See 
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 125-29 (2d Cir. 2010); Cayuga 
Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 276-77 (2d Cir. 2005). Then, likely because it had 
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Under this “inherent disruption rule,” the court has dismissed five tribal 
land claims in the twelve years since Sherrill.99 Because the Supreme Court 
has denied certiorari in all five cases,100 this rule has ended the era of land 
claims in the Second Circuit. 
The Second Circuit developed its inherent disruption rule for tribal land 
claims in two steps. First, in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, the court held 
that Sherrill bars “possessory” land claims because they inherently disrupt 
non-Indian settled land ownership.101 Before Sherrill, the district court in 
Cayuga awarded the tribe almost $250 million in damages and interest for 
the fair market value of its dispossessed land and the fair rental value of that 
land between the dispossession and judgment.102 After Sherrill, the Second 
                                                                                                                 
held that Sherrill applies to all tribal land claims, the court framed its rule as a three-factor 
test to determine when Sherrill barred the claim. See Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. 
App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Three specific factors determine when ancestral land claims 
are foreclosed on equitable grounds: (1) ‘the length of time at issue between an historical 
injustice and the present day’; (2) ‘the disruptive nature of claims long delayed’; and (3) ‘the 
degree to which these claims upset the justifiable expectations of individuals and entities far 
removed from the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ injury.’” (quoting County of Oneida, 
617 F.3d at 127)). Eventually, the court stopped applying these factors and instead 
articulated its inherent disruption bar on all tribal land claims. See supra text accompanying 
note 96. 
 98. See, e.g., County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 148 (Gershon, J. dissenting) (“With this 
decision, the majority forecloses plaintiffs from bringing any claims seeking any remedy for 
their treatment at the hands of the State.”); Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling 
the Racial Context of Property Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALB. GOV'T 
L. REV. 1, 43 (2017) (arguing that the Second Circuit’s approach “den[ies] New York tribes 
any remedy whatsoever for the illegal taking of their lands”). 
 99. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, 628 F. App’x 54, 55 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166; Onondaga Nation, 500 F. App’x at 89-90; County of 
Oneida, 617 F.3d at 118; Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 268. The Northern District of New York ruled 
on Sherrill’s application in a sixth tribal land claim involving the Mohawks. Because the 
court did not dismiss all of the tribe’s claims, see Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. 
New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2013 WL 3992830, at *22 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), the 
tribe could not appeal the ruling to the Second Circuit. Since the 2013 decision, the parties 
have engaged in extensive settlement negotiations. See, e.g., Joint Status Report and Request 
for Extension of Stay Order at 1, Can. St. Regis, No. 5:82-CV-0783 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 
2017); Joint Status Report at 1, Can. St. Regis, No. 5:82-CV-0783 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2013).  
 100. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, 136 S. Ct. 2512 (2016); Stockbridge-
Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 571 
U.S. 969 (2013); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 565 U.S. 970 (2011); Cayuga 
Indian Nation v. Pataki, 547 U.S. 1128 (2006). 
 101. 413 F.3d at 275. 
 102. See id. at 271-73. 
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Circuit reversed.103 The court reasoned that Sherrill’s broad language about 
disruption demonstrated that its equitable defense should apply to any 
disruptive tribal land claim, even those that are “legally viable and 
[brought] within the statute of limitations.”104 Refusing to distinguish 
Sherrill on the basis that the district court here awarded monetary damages 
rather than equitable relief permitting the Tribe to assert its sovereignty, the 
Second Circuit thought the Cayuga claims were premised on “a continuing 
right to immediate possession” and thus were inherently disruptive, even if 
relief were monetized.105 Quoting Sherrill, it reasoned that, “[w]hether 
characterized as an action at law or in equity, any remedy flowing from this 
possessory land claim, which would call into question title to over 60,000 
acres of land in upstate New York, can only be understood as a remedy that 
would . . . ‘project redress into the present and future.’”106 To justify 
applying Sherrill to actions at law, the court also cited the “unusual 
considerations at play in this area of the law” and the fact that “ordinary 
common law principles are . . . ‘not readily transferrable to this action.’”107 
Second, Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida extended Cayuga “to 
bar any ancient land claims that are disruptive of significant and justified 
societal expectations that have arisen as a result of a lapse of time during 
which the plaintiffs did not seek relief.”108 The district court held that 
Cayuga did not bar the OIN’s claim for fair compensation for its two-
hundred-year-old land sale to New York because the claim sought only 
retrospective relief for damages and was not based on a continuing 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See id. at 277-78 
 104. See id. at 273-74. 
 105. See id. at 274-75. 
 106. Id. at 275 (quoting City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 n.14 
(2005)). 
 107. Id. at 276 (quoting Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 79 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (N.D.N.Y. 
1999)). Judge Hall dissented. See id. at 280 (Hall, J., dissenting). She emphasized that laches 
and Sherrill’s equitable considerations focused not on the entire claim but on the specific 
remedy requested. See id. at 284, 288-89. For the tribe’s ejectment claim, she thought 
restoration of possession would be disruptive and prejudicial under Sherrill but awarding 
damages would not be. See id. at 284-85. She would also not have barred the trespass claim 
because it did not depend on actual possession of the land. See id. at 285. She took special 
issue with the majority’s contention that monetary damages would be disruptive in the same 
way as the remedy sought in Sherrill. See id. at 290 & n.13 (“The contention that a damages 
award for either past fair rental value or present fair market value would ‘project redress into 
the present and future’ . . . vitiates any reasonable meaning the Supreme Court could have 
intended that phrase to have.” (quoting Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275)). 
 108. 617 F.3d 114, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
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possessory right.109 The Second Circuit reversed on this issue. It reasoned 
that Sherrill and Cayuga’s equitable defense applied to “all ancient land 
claims that are disruptive of justified societal interests that have developed 
over a long period of time, of which possessory claims are merely one type, 
and regardless of the particular remedy sought.”110 The court noted that 
Sherrill and Cayuga emphasized the disruptive nature of the remedy or 
claim, not whether it was possessory; in fact, Sherrill did not even involve 
possession because the OIN already owned the land.111 The court 
recognized two versions of the claim at issue: a contract claim by the OIN 
for receipt of unconscionable consideration and a claim by the United 
States for violation of the Nonintercourse Act. However, it dismissed both 
claims because, although the parties only sought monetary damages, the 
claims undermined the validity of the land transfer and threw current title 
into doubt.112 
The Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule is notable for a number of 
reasons. To start, it permits courts to dismiss tribal land claims on the 
pleadings.113 Although Cayuga and County of Oneida reached the Second 
Circuit after a trial and on summary judgment, respectively,114 the Second 
Circuit has affirmed district court decisions applying the inherent disruption 
rule to bar tribal land claims on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.115 Tribes are not 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137-40 (N.D.N.Y. 
2007), aff’d in part and reversed in part sub. nom. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114. 
 110. See County of Oneida, 617 F.3d. at 136.  
 111. See id. at 135-36. 
 112. See id. at 129-30, 136-38. Judge Gershon dissented. See id. at 141 (Gershon, J., 
dissenting). Noting the nonpossessory nature of the claim, she argued that it did not 
implicate land possession or ownership at all and thus did not “project redress into the 
present and future.” Id. at 145 (quoting Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275). She thought the presence 
of the United States in the litigation suing New York for violating a federal statute made the 
nonpossessory nature of the claim especially clear. See id. at 147. She also emphasized that 
Sherrill and Cayuga concerned “difficult present-day complications that would affect 
innocent third-party purchasers and the current value of the developed land”; these concerns 
were irrelevant to the OIN’s fair compensation claim since it was no different today than if it 
had been brought immediately after the sales to New York. See id. (“[A] fair compensation 
remedy would not upset present-day expectations because it has nothing to do with the 
present at all.”). Thus, she would have limited Cayuga’s bar to possessory land claims. See 
id. at 147-48. 
 113. See Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 357, 380 (2009). 
 114. See County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 117; Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 269-73. 
 115. See Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, No. 3:86-CV-1140 (LEK/DEP), 2013 
WL 3822093, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), aff’d, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014); Onondaga 
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entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing116 and cannot present 
evidence outside the pleadings.117 Courts rely on judicial notice for 
information on the local non-Indian population and development of the 
area.118 
Moreover, the Second Circuit views the rule as a new equitable defense 
combining laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.119 It has therefore 
rejected arguments based on traditional laches principles.120 Most 
significantly, tribes cannot argue that their delay in bringing suit was 
                                                                                                                 
Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL 3806492, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 22, 2010), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New 
York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 WL 3501099, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006), aff’d, 
628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015). The Northern District of New York heard a fourth case on a 
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. 
New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2012 WL 8503274, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012), report 
and recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part, 2013 WL 3992830 (N.D.N.Y. 
July 23, 2013). 
 116. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 136-37 (N.D.N.Y. 
2007), aff’d in part and reversed in part sub nom. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114. 
 117. See, e.g., Can. St. Regis, 2012 WL 8503274, at *6 n.15; see also Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 76 MONT. L. REV. 97, 110 (2015) (“In short, no 
evidence is necessary in the Second Circuit to dismiss Indian land claims under the 
Nonintercourse Act—a court may dismiss them as a matter of law.”). 
 118. See Onondaga, 500 F. App’x at 89-90. In one case, the district court took judicial 
notice of U.S. Census data on the local non-Indian population offered by both parties, which 
differed in the scope of the geographical area measured. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 
3992830, at *17-18. 
 119. See, e.g., Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166; County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 127-
28. 
 120. Outside the Second Circuit, some courts have interpreted Sherrill to permit the 
application of traditional laches against tribes. An Arizona district court, for example, 
applied traditional laches (though without any analysis of whether Sherrill required 
otherwise) to a tribal suit to bar access to a federal right-of-way through its land. See In re 
Schugg, 384 B.R. 263, 277-78 (D. Ariz. 2008). Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
court’s laches analysis, it did not contest that laches could apply to the claim. See Lyon v. 
Gila River Indian Cmty., 626 F.3d 1059, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Mishewal Wappo 
Tribe v. Salazar, No. 5:09-cv-02502 EJD, 2011 WL 5038356, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 
2011) (noting that Sherrill applied traditional laches and suggesting, while not deciding, that 
laches could bar a tribal suit for federal recognition and an order requiring the federal 
government to take its land into trust since the tribe significantly delayed in bringing suit 
after it was terminated, allowing the local municipalities to have developed justifiable 
reliance on use of the land at issue); Ottawa Tribe v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., 541 F. Supp. 
2d 971, 976-80 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (applying traditional laches to bar a tribe from exercising 
certain hunting and fishing rights pursuant to its treaty with the federal government), aff’d on 
other grounds, 577 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
260 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
 
reasonable,121 even if state and federal governments contributed to the 
delay.122 The Second Circuit has also held that, since Sherrill did not rely 
on traditional laches, the inherent disruption rule can bar legal relief even if 
the claim falls within the statute of limitations.123 
Additionally, the specifics of the tribe’s claims are not relevant to the 
inherent disruption rule. The rule applies whether the claim is legal or 
equitable.124 It applies to whatever relief the tribe seeks,125 even a 
declaratory judgment, because “the claims themselves expressly seek to 
undermine the validity of the original transfer of the subject lands and 
dramatically upset the settled expectations of current land-owners.”126 The 
Second Circuit seems to assume a claim is as disruptive as the most 
disruptive remedy available, even if the tribe does not seek that remedy or 
the court would never award it.127 The inherent disruption rule does not 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Onondaga, 500 F. App’x at 90; Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 
279 (2d Cir. 2005); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 
WL 3501099, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006), aff’d, 628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 122. See Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL 
3806492, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 123. See Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166. In arguing that laches should not bar 
legal claims within the statute of limitations, tribes have relied on Petrella v. MGM, Inc., 572 
U.S. 663, 667-68 (2014), which held that laches did not bar a copyright claim brought within 
the statute of limitations set in the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 3-15, 
Shinnecock, 628 F. App’x 54 (No. 14-4445(L)), 2015 WL 3901820. The Second Circuit has 
rejected this argument primarily because it believes Congress has not established a statute of 
limitations for tribal land claims. See, e.g., Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166. But see 
infra note 274 (noting the unsettled question of whether 28 U.S.C. § 2415 set a statute of 
limitations for tribal land claims). However, the Second Circuit has also stated that, even if 
there were a statute of limitations, Petrella would not apply because Sherrill did not utilize 
traditional laches. See id.; see also Shinnecock, 628 F. App’x at 55 (holding that 
Stockbridge-Munsee foreclosed the tribe’s argument that Petrella abrogated Cayuga and 
County of Oneida).  
 124. See, e.g., Onondaga, 2010 WL 3806492, at *5; Fort, supra note 113, at 380; supra 
text accompanying notes 106-07 (explaining the Second Circuit’s rationale in Cayuga for 
applying Sherrill to bar actions at law). 
 125. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(barring the tribe’s possessory land claims regardless of whether it sought “actual ejectment, 
damages for ongoing trespass liability, or, instead, payment of the fair market value of the 
property in a single lump sum”). 
 126. Onondaga, 2010 WL 3806492, at *7; accord Onondaga, 500 F. App’x at 89 (“The 
disruptive nature of the claims is indisputable as a matter of law. . . . [A] declaratory 
judgment alone—even without a contemporaneous request for an ejectment—would be 
disruptive.”). 
 127. See Kathryn Fort, Disruption and Impossibility: The New Laches and the 
Unfortunate Resolution of the Modern Iroquois Land Claims, 11 WYO. L. REV. 375, 400 
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require the dispute to concern a significant amount of land or number of 
landowners because “the test for disruptiveness is not based on strict 
numeric calculations” and Sherrill itself involved only small parcels of 
land.128 
The Second Circuit has held that its inherent disruption rule applies 
against the United States in addition to tribes. Although laches traditionally 
does not bar the United States’ claims, the court in Cayuga noted that this 
was not a per se rule.129 It adopted from the Seventh Circuit three contexts 
where laches could bar the United States’ claims: “egregious instances of 
laches,” claims with no statute of limitations, and suits to enforce private 
rights.130 The Cayuga court found all three exceptions applicable because 
the United States did not bring suit for two hundred years, there was no 
statute of limitations for the claim until 1966, and the United States sued on 
behalf of the tribe.131 Five years later, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that the 
intervention of the United States does not prevent application of the 
inherent disruption rule.132 
                                                                                                                 
(2011) (noting that the Second Circuit’s doctrine “combines the disruption and impossibility 
considerations from cases where ejectment or dispossession is a highly unlikely, but a 
possible remedy, and applies them to any remedy conceived of by the tribes or district courts 
for the illegal takings of tribal lands”). 
 128. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 WL 
3501099, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006), aff’d, 628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015); accord 
Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2012 WL 
8503274, at *11 n.21 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012), report and recommendation adopted in 
part and rejected in part, 2013 WL 3992830 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013). 
 129. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 278 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)). 
 130. See id. at 278-79 (citing United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 
1995)).  
 131. See id. at 279. Judge Hall also dissented from this part of the panel opinion. See id. 
at 286-88 (Hall, J., dissenting). She argued that Clearfield Trust, which the majority cited for 
its contention that there is no categorical bar on subjecting the United States to laches, only 
applied laches against the United States since there was no statute of limitations and the 
United States’ claims related to “business and commerce,” not its “sovereign authority and 
rights.” Id. at 286-87. She then rejected the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Administrative 
Enterprises as based on a faulty reading of Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 287-88, 287 
n.9. Finally, she argued that, even if the three exceptions from Administrative Enterprises 
were legitimate, they did not apply to the United States’ intervention in the Cayuga land 
claim litigation because the delay in bringing suit may have been reasonable, Congress had 
set a statute of limitations, and the United States protects a public interest when it sues on a 
tribe’s behalf. See id. at 288.  
 132. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 129 (2d Cir. 2010).  
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Finally, the Second Circuit has not specified the length of delay and type 
of disruption required to trigger the inherent disruption rule. As to the 
former, all the claims the Second Circuit has adjudicated post-Sherrill arose 
out of land transfers that occurred at least 130 years before suit was filed.133 
Sometimes, the court has not even relied on the specific length of the delay, 
but instead only referred to the “tremendous expanse of time”134 or stated 
that “the allegedly void transfers occurred long ago.”135 Because the OIN’s 
delay in bringing suit in Sherrill was as long as the shortest period the 
Second Circuit has considered, the court can easily say that the delays are 
sufficiently long under Supreme Court precedent.136 For a unique claim in 
one case, however, a district court held that a forty-year delay between the 
allegedly invalid land transfer and the lawsuit was too short for Sherrill to 
apply.137  
The Second Circuit has been similarly vague about what level of 
disruption to non-Indian settled expectations is required to trigger the 
inherent disruption rule.138 In one case, the court simply said the area was 
“extensively populated by non-Indians” and “predominantly non-Indian 
today” with “significant material development by private persons and 
enterprises as well as by public entities.”139 In another, the court noted that 
tribal members “have not resided on the lands at issue since the nineteenth 
century,” their “primary reservation lands are located elsewhere,” and “the 
land has been owned and developed by other parties subject to State and 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(144 years); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (183 years); 
Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 269 (174 years); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 
128, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (almost 130 years), aff’d in part and reversed in part sub nom. 
County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); Shinnecock, 2006 WL 3501099, at *5 (over 
140 years). 
 134. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 126. 
 135. Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166. 
 136. Cf. Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (noting that it was bound by 
Sherrill to find that the OIN’s delay in bringing suit was sufficiently long because the suit 
involved the same underlying land claim). 
 137. See Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2013 
WL 3992830, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013). 
 138. See id. at *18 (“[N]o bright-line rule exists such that an Indian population of less 
than X percent establishes a non-Indian character and greater than X percent establishes an 
Indian character . . . .”). 
 139. Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL 3806492, at *8 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010)). 
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local regulation.”140 Where the opinions have specified the size of the local 
non-Indian population, it has always been over 99%.141 Courts have noted 
as especially concerning tribal claims that would interfere with major 
transportation routes142 and infrastructure developments.143 These cases all 
represented straightforward applications of Sherrill, where the non-Indian 
population was less than 1%, and the tribe owned less than 1.5% of the 
land.144 
2. Other Courts 
Two courts outside the Second Circuit have adopted the inherent 
disruption rule to dismiss tribal land claims.145 In New Jersey Sand Hill 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Stockbridge-Munsee, 756 F.3d at 166; see also County of Oneida, 617 F.3d at 126-
27 (stating only that “most of the Oneidas have moved elsewhere, the subject lands have 
passed into the hands of a multitude of entities and individuals . . . , and these parties have 
themselves both bought and sold the lands, and also developed them to an enormous 
extent”).  
 141. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887 (TCP), 2006 WL 
3501099, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (stating that Suffolk County is 0.2% Indian), aff’d, 
628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015); Oneida Indian Nation, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (noting that 
Oneida and Madison Counties are 0.2% and 0.6% Indian, respectively). 
 142. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *5 (“Ejecting the state or otherwise 
requiring that the highway be rerouted at this late date would be highly disruptive in 
precisely the way Sherrill laches operates to prevent . . . .”); Shinnecock, 2006 WL 3501099, 
at *5 n.9 (“[E]jecting the Long Island Railroad Company from the Subject Lands would 
have devastating consequences to the region's economy and a drastic impact on thousands of 
commuters.”). 
 143. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *9 (dismissing a tribal land claim under 
Sherrill in part because of “the presence of a major hydroelectric facility” on the disputed 
land). 
 144. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211 (2005). 
 145. Two other courts have also touched on Sherrill’s application to tribal land claims, 
but they did not decide the issue. In Paiute-Shoshone Indians v. City of Los Angeles, an 
Eastern District of California court seemed willing to apply Sherrill to a tribal land claim 
seeking ejection of current owners from land to which the Tribe alleged it did not lawfully 
surrender its title in 1938, but it refused to do so on the pleadings since “the issue of laches 
raises significant questions of fact” and Sherrill itself was decided on summary judgment. 
See No. 1:06-cv-00736 OWW LJO, 2007 WL 521403, at *2, *4, *11 & n.4 (E.D. Cal. 
Feb. 15, 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 637 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2011). As the court issued this 
decision before the Second Circuit made explicit that its rule applied at the pleadings stage, 
it is not clear whether it was affirmatively disagreeing with the Second Circuit on this issue. 
Because the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Tribe’s complaint under Rule 19 for failing to join 
the United States as an indispensable party, see Paiute-Shoshone, 637 F.3d at 995-96, and 
the Tribe voluntarily dismissed its amended complaint attempting to do so, see Notice of 
Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice at 2, Paiute-Shoshone, No. 1:06-cv-00736 (E.D. Cal. 
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Band of Lenape & Cherokee Indians v. Corzine, for example, a New Jersey 
district court dismissed a tribal claim that New Jersey and its counties 
“ha[d] converted and misappropriated their land and other property rights 
for more than 200 years.”146 Similarly, in Wolfchild v. Redwood County, a 
Minnesota district court dismissed a suit on behalf of a class of Indians 
seeking recognition and possession of a twelve-square-mile reservation they 
alleged Congress promised their ancestors for remaining loyal to the United 
States during a Sioux uprising in the 1860s.147 In both cases, the court 
emphasized the long delay of the tribe in bringing suit and the inherent risk 
of disrupting non-Indian settled expectations.148 In Wolfchild, the court also 
rejected an attempt to distinguish Sherrill on the grounds that the OIN’s 
claim was based on aboriginal title and was equitable, not legal.149 
One district court within the Second Circuit has attempted to mitigate the 
harsh application of the inherent disruption rule, though seemingly in a way 
incompatible with the Second Circuit’s guidance. In Canadian St. Regis 
Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, Judge Kahn of the Northern District 
of New York permitted two tribal claims to survive a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings.150 Analyzing the suit separately for each type and section 
                                                                                                                 
Feb. 28, 2012), the court never ruled on the Sherrill issue. In Delaware Nation v. 
Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit declined to address Sherrill’s application to a tribal claim for 
possession of 315 acres of land in Pennsylvania 250 years after the alleged dispossession. 
446 F.3d 410, 413, 415 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006). Because the court held that Pennsylvania had 
extinguished the tribe’s aboriginal title with its 1737 land purchase and the Nonintercourse 
Act did not bar the sale of land held by the tribal chief individually, the court did not reach 
the defendants’ Sherrill argument. See id. at 415-19, 415 n.8. 
 146. No. 09-683 (KSG), 2010 WL 2674565, at *1 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010). The court 
specifically applied Sherrill to bar claims based on a 1758 treaty, see id. at *20-21, after 
dismissing many of the claims on other grounds, id. at *5-20. 
 147. See 91 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1095-98 (D. Minn. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 824 
F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 447 (2016). 
 148. See id. at 1102-03, 1105 (noting that the tribal claim arose from an 1863 Act of 
Congress and a land sale in 1895 and relying on Second Circuit caselaw to find that the 
claim threatened the expectations of the local municipalities and individual property 
owners); Sand Hill, 2010 WL 2674565, at *21 (stating that “the plaintiffs [sought] 
possessory redress for an alleged contractual violation that ripened, at the latest, 208 years 
ago” and that “[t]he grant of such relief would be disruptive to say the least” because “much 
has happened in the interim”). 
 149. See Wolfchild, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 1105.  
 150. See Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 2013 
WL 3992830, at *8-21 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013). Interestingly, in Onondaga and 
Stockbridge-Munsee, Judge Kahn held that the inherent disruption rule completely barred the 
tribal suits. See Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, No. 3:86-CV-1140 (LEK/DEP), 
2013 WL 3822093, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), aff’d, 756 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2014); 
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of land the Tribe claimed,151 he first declined to find that a claim concerning 
rights-of-way for power-line easements was barred, as only forty years had 
passed between the signing of the argument and the tribal lawsuit.152 
Second, he permitted the Tribe to pursue its claim for a two-thousand-acre 
triangle sandwiched by its reservation on two sides.153 He noted that, 
although the claim was over a century old and disruptive, the area did not 
have a “longstanding distinctly non-Indian character.”154 He emphasized 
that the triangle had a “large majority of Indian inhabitants” and a “much 
higher concentration of Indian inhabitants than the surrounding region.”155 
Further, more Mohawks remained in New York in the 1800s than Cayugas 
and Oneidas.156 In reaching his holding, Judge Kahn relied heavily on the 
fairness considerations of equity and noted that it would be “disturbingly 
anti-democratic” to read Sherrill and its progeny to bar all tribal land claims 
because Congress has itself set a statute of limitations.157  
  
                                                                                                                 
Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL 3806492, at *7-8 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012). The Mohawk land claim’s 
unique facts likely permitted him to distinguish the case from Cayuga and County of Oneida 
in a way that the Onondaga and Stockbridge-Munsee land claims did not.  
 151. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *3-4 (justifying this analysis by noting 
that, unlike Sherrill, Cayuga, County of Oneida, and Onondaga, the Mohawk claims 
involved rights-of-way, international borders, and land carved out from its reservation in 
different treaties). This approach seems inconsistent with Sherrill, which did not 
differentiate among the OIN’s patchwork of land parcels. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida 
Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211-21 (2005). Judge Kahn noted that Sherrill involved 
concerns about checkerboarding jurisdiction and constantly changing parcels as the OIN 
purchased new land, in contrast to the “easily identifiable and discrete areas” at issue with 
the Mohawk claims. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *4. Although he has a point, 
the Sherrill Court could have, but did not, fashion a test that considered each parcel’s 
disruption separately. But see infra note 317 (arguing that the Court should alter the Sherrill 
framework to permit more individualized and fact-specific analyses of disruption).  
 152. See Can. St. Regis, 2013 WL 3992830, at *6-8. 
 153. See id. at *15-20. 
 154. See id. at *16-17. 
 155. See id. at *19. 
 156. Id. at *19-20. 
 157. See id. at *3, *16 & n.24. The Second Circuit would likely take issue with this 
because it has held that Sherrill created a unique defense not tied to traditional equitable 
concerns, see supra text accompanying note 119, and that the Indian Claims Limitation Act 
did not set a statute of limitations for tribal land claims, see supra note 123. 
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1. Casino Disputes in New York 
Sherrill’s most direct application has come in two cases in the Northern 
District of New York that, like Sherrill, involved tribal attempts to secure 
immunity from local laws for activities on repurchased lands within their 
historic reservations. In these cases, the tribes attempted to construct class 
II gaming facilities in violation of local zoning laws.158 Relying on Sherrill, 
both judges ruled against the tribes in terse fashion.159 If tax immunity was 
disruptive in Sherrill, the judges reasoned, immunity from zoning laws was 
“even more disruptive.”160 More damning to the tribes, Sherrill explicitly 
mentioned concerns about disruption from zoning law immunity and cited 
these two cases as examples.161 The judges concluded that the “Supreme 
Court’s strong language in City of Sherrill regarding the disruptive effect on 
the everyday administration of state and local governments bar[red] the 
Nation from asserting immunity from state and local zoning laws and 
regulations.”162 
The Eastern District of New York found Sherrill applicable in a different 
casino zoning dispute involving the Shinnecocks. Before the Second Circuit 
vacated the decision for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court 
conducted a detailed Sherrill analysis after a thirty-day bench trial. The 
district court concluded that Sherrill barred construction of a casino on 
tribal nontrust land in violation of state and local laws.163 The court made 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Village of Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Town of Aurelius, No. 5:03-CV-00690 (NPM), 
2004 WL 1945359, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2004). 
 159. See Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206 (granting summary judgment to the 
Village and vacating the tribe’s permanent injunction); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Town of 
Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. 278, 282 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting the Town judgment on the 
pleadings). 
 160. Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206; accord Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. at 281. 
 161. Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206; accord Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. at 281; see also 
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 220 (2005) (noting that if it ruled for 
the OIN, “little would prevent the Tribe from initiating a new generation of litigation to free 
the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory controls that protect all landowners in the 
area”); id. at 220 n.13 (referring to the attempts of the tribes in Aurelius and Union Springs 
“to free historic reservation lands purchased in the open market from local regulatory 
controls”). 
 162. See Union Springs, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 206; accord Aurelius, 233 F.R.D. at 282. 
 163. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 188, 195-96, 279-
91 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 686 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2012). 
The opinion is not clear on the ownership history of the land, but the court suggested that, 
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three preliminary rulings on Sherrill’s applicability. First, even though the 
Tribe possessed the land continuously, unlike the OIN in Sherrill, Cayuga 
required the court to apply Sherrill to any disruptive land claim.164 Second, 
because Sherrill and Cayuga “analyzed . . . potential future disruptiveness 
that would result from a decision in favor of the tribe,” the state could 
introduce evidence of possible uses for the land beyond the proposed 
casino.165 The court emphasized that it would waste judicial resources to 
require the state to seek an injunction each time the Tribe conducted a 
slightly more disruptive activity.166 Third, since recognizing the Tribe’s 
sovereignty would permit it to ignore state law, the court rejected the 
argument that it should consider in its disruption analysis the Tribe’s 
agreement to build its casino in accordance with state environmental 
laws.167 
The court then held that Sherrill barred the Tribe from asserting 
sovereignty over the land to secure an exemption from state and local 
zoning laws.168 The court noted that the Tribe had not previously asserted 
sovereignty on the land and utilized it only “for timber and periodic social 
gatherings.”169 The court also recognized that, although the town never 
imposed property taxes, it had exercised jurisdiction in other ways for 
centuries without objection from the Tribe.170 Finally, relying on substantial 
factual evidence and expert testimony, the court found that the construction 
                                                                                                                 
although the tribe ceded title to the land to colonists in the 1600s, it retained possession 
continuously through the present. See id. at 280. 
 164. See id. at 280-81.  
 165. See id. at 281-83. The court noted, however, that even the proposed casino was 
sufficiently disruptive that Sherrill compelled a ruling for the state. See id. at 283.  
 166. See id. at 288. 
 167. See id. at 287. The court also held that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act did not 
authorize the casino because the tribe was not federally recognized at the time. See id. at 
293; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (2012) (requiring a tribe be federally recognized to fall 
within IGRA’s scope). This provided an independent basis for the court’s holding, see 
Shinnecock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 294 (finding that IGRA preempted any common law right for 
the tribe to engage in gaming), but it also meant that the Tribe would not have to sign a 
tribal-state compact if the court had recognized its right to build a casino.  
 168. See Shinnecock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 283-91.  
 169. Id. at 283-84 (citing a lack of permanent structures or fencing on the land; a lack of 
tribal laws for use of the land; an archeological study finding “minimal human activity” on 
the land; and the Tribe’s failure to protest encroachment by a non-Indian neighboring 
landowner). 
 170. See id. at 284-85 (noting inclusion of the land in a 1738 subdivision; the town’s 
regulation of timber harvesting and improvement of a public road on the land; and its 1957 
zoning ordinance that included the land). 
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and operation of the casino would disrupt state and local governance, as 
well as the settled expectations of non-Indian landowners.171 Of most 
concern were the burdens of providing police, fire, ambulance, water, and 
other services to the casino; the increased traffic and accompanying safety 
hazards; and the health and environmental consequences of construction.172 
2. Reservation Diminishment 
Beyond these New York casino disputes, courts have wrestled with 
whether and how to apply Sherrill to sovereignty claims primarily in 
reservation diminishment cases where a party has argued that Congress 
shrunk or eliminated a reservation. No court has relied on Sherrill 
exclusively to find a reservation diminished or to deny a tribe the ability to 
exercise sovereignty over its reservation, but some have suggested they 
would do so in an appropriate case.173  
Both the Second Circuit and the Northern District of New York have 
repeatedly held that Sherrill did not disturb the Second Circuit’s holding 
that the Oneida reservation has not been disestablished.174 They have 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See id. at 285-91. 
 172. See id. at 285-87. In a separate sovereignty question that emerged in a New York 
casino dispute, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that Sherrill made the land-to-trust 
process of the IRA “the sole means for a tribe to establish jurisdiction over off-reservation 
fee lands.” Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cty. v. Chaudhuri, 802 F.3d 267, 284 
n.14 (2d Cir. 2015). The court noted correctly that, while Sherrill endorsed the IRA process, 
it “did not state that this was the only avenue” to do so. Id.; see also City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005) (“[The IRA] provides the proper avenue for 
OIN to reestablish sovereign authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years 
ago.”). Thus, Congress can provide a tribe-specific statutory scheme to effectuate the same 
purpose. See Citizens Against Casino Gambling, 802 F.3d at 284 n.14 (noting that the 
Seneca Nation Settlement Act “provided a mechanism comparable to the IRA through which 
the Seneca Nation could attain jurisdiction” over newly purchased lands and thus that the 
Tribe did not “unilaterally assert jurisdiction” over their land like the OIN did in Sherrill). 
 173. In a case not described below, the Eighth Circuit denied South Dakota’s motion to 
amend its petition for rehearing to include a Sherrill argument after rejecting its reservation 
diminishment claim. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 606 F.3d 985, 992-93 (8th 
Cir. 2010).  
 174. See, e.g., Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556, 563 (2d 
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-1320, 2017 WL 5660979 (Nov. 27, 2017); Oneida Indian 
Nation v. Madison County, 665 F.3d 408, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2011); Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. 
Ass’n v. Jewell, No. 6:08-CV-0660 (LEK/DEP), 2015 WL 1400384, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 26, 2015), aff’d 673 F. App’x 63 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2134 (2017); 
Town of Verona v. Jewell, No. 6:08-cv-0647 (LEK/DEP), 2015 WL 1400291, at *6 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015); Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-660 
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emphasized that Sherrill explicitly declined to address the disestablishment 
question175 and that the decision recognized that only Congress can 
disestablish a reservation.176 They further rejected the argument that the 
OIN reservation must be disestablished simply because “sovereignty is a 
distinguishing characteristic of an Indian reservation” and Sherrill denied 
the OIN the ability to exercise sovereignty over the land.177 
Similarly, the Eastern District of Michigan has taken a strong stance 
against reliance on Sherrill in reservation diminishment cases.178 In 
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, a tribal-state jurisdictional 
dispute, the court articulated three reasons for its position that Sherrill did 
not affect reservation diminishment cases.179 First, “the challenged conduct 
[was] not the same sort of distinct ancient wrong arising from the early days 
of the Republic,” as was found in Sherrill or Cayuga, because the 
reservation diminishment dispute concerned the state’s “incremental 
assumption of governmental responsibilities” over the reservation since 
treaties were signed.180 Second, while Sherrill and Cayuga involved 
Nonintercourse Act violations with no statutorily defined remedy, the suit 
here arose from a treaty violation, a remedy which does not require the 
same exercise of judicial discretion.181 Third, the Tribe stipulated it was not 
seeking property tax exemptions, the ability to govern nonmembers, or the 
“resurrection of an ancient claim to the land” like those at issue in Sherrill 
and Cayuga; instead, it merely sought to exercise its treaty right to self-
governance.182 The court recognized that the United States had intervened 
                                                                                                                 
(LEK/DEP), 2010 WL 786526, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010); New York v. Salazar, 
No. 6:08-CV-644 (LEK/GJD), 2009 WL 3165591, at *8-9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009).  
 175. See, e.g., Madison County, 665 F.3d at 443; Salazar, 2009 WL 3165591, at *9. 
 176. See, e.g., Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n, 2010 WL 786526, at *11. 
 177. See Town of Verona v. Salazar, No. 6:08-cv-647 (LEK/GJD), 2009 WL 3165556, at 
*6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Upstate Citizens, 841 F.3d 556, cert. denied, 
No. 16-1320, 2017 WL 5660979 (Nov. 27, 2017). In a case involving the Cayugas, the New 
York Court of Appeals agreed that Sherrill said nothing about reservation diminishment. See 
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233, 247-49 (N.Y. 2010). 
 178. Without much explanation, a judge in the Eastern District of Wisconsin appeared to 
agree with the Eastern District of Michigan. See Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, No. 16-
C-1217, 2017 WL 4773299, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 2017) (noting that, unless the town 
could show that Congress had diminished the reservation, Cabazon, not Sherrill, governed 
whether its special events ordinance applied to tribal activities).  
 179. See No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL 4808823, at *1-2, *22-23 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 
2008). 
 180. Id. at *22.  
 181. See id. 
 182. Id.  
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in its sovereign capacity to enforce its treaties with the Tribe and that 
equitable doctrines cannot alter treaty obligations.183 In ruling for the Tribe, 
the court declined to read Sherrill and Cayuga for the broad proposition that 
“Indian tribes are barred by equitable defenses when they request 
prospective relief contrary to contemporary ‘justifiable expectations’ of a 
non-Indian population—public and private.”184 
Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has suggested that Sherrill might apply to 
reservation diminishment claims. In Osage Nation v. Irby, a dispute 
concerning state tax authority, the court used the established Solem test for 
reservation diminishment to affirm the district court’s holding that 
Congress had diminished a reservation in Osage County.185 The district 
court had also ruled for the state on its Sherrill argument. Due to the state’s 
governance of the county for over one hundred years, the population 
makeup containing merely 20.7% Indian and 5.4% Osage, and the Tribe’s 
delayed challenge to the state’s tax authority, the district court thought that 
“[r]ecognizing Osage County as a reservation and ousting Oklahoma 
income taxation over Osage members would have significant practical 
consequences not only for income taxation, but potentially for civil, 
criminal and regulatory jurisdiction.”186 The Tenth Circuit panel did not 
review this Sherrill holding, but it did suggest that “‘the longstanding 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See id. at *23 (“It would be remarkable to hold that the commitments and 
obligations of the United States embodied in its treaties may be altered by a judicially 
endorsed equitable defense based upon the State of Michigan’s inconsistent incremental 
exercise of governmental authority over time.”). 
 184. Id. at *17 (quoting City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 215 
(2005)). 
 185. 597 F.3d 1117, 1121-27 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’g sub nom. Osage Nation v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Okla. 2009). The Solem test asks 
whether Congress intended to diminish the reservation by looking at the statutory language 
of Congress’s enactment, its legislative history, and post-enactment history. See COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04(3), at 199 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
2012). 
 186. Osage, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1265-66, 1266 n.15. The court put significant weight on 
the state’s need to collect taxes to provide services to the County and its residents: 
The ability to raise revenues to support its services to Osage County lands and 
the tax status of Osage tribal members is of critical importance to Oklahoma. If 
this Court were to now establish Osage County as a reservation more than a 
century after Congress was understood to have dissolved that status and that 
such status automatically deprives Oklahoma of the ability to fund services in 
Osage County through income taxes, the State's provision of services would be 
severely threatened. 
Id. at 1265. 
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assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is [predominantly] 
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, may create justifiable 
expectations’ that ‘merit heavy weight.’”187 The import of this statement is 
unclear. The panel might have thought Sherrill was either an alternative 
means of finding reservation diminishment or instead a doctrine limiting 
relief after finding a reservation undiminished.188 Although it may not have 
been intentional, the district court’s language about the disruption from 
“establishing Osage County as a reservation” suggests that it believed the 
former.189  
Six years later, however, in Ute Indian Tribe v. Myton, the Tenth Circuit 
refused to apply Sherrill to bar a tribal suit enjoining a town from 
exercising criminal jurisdiction on a reservation on the basis that the Tribe’s 
long delay in bringing suit induced the town to reasonably believe that it 
did not contain reservation lands.190 The panel questioned whether Sherrill 
could apply to a suit involving tribal trust lands because the United States is 
generally not subject to laches.191 It also doubted that the town’s belief was 
justified because the federal government told it in 1945 that the Tribe had 
jurisdiction within its boundaries, the Tribe consistently objected after the 
town asserted jurisdiction over the lands, the Tribe won two judgments 
holding that all or some of the town was Indian Country, and the state and 
county accepted tribal jurisdiction.192 The court contrasted this with 
Sherrill, “where the land was sold to nontribal members and neither the 
tribe nor the federal government did anything to assert their rights ‘[f]rom 
the early 1800’s into the 1970’s.’”193 The panel did not say whether it 
would have followed the Sherrill-related concerns its colleagues had 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1127-28 (alteration in original) (quoting Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 215-
16).  
 188. See infra text accompanying notes 284-86 (discussing the conceptual distinction 
between these two issues). 
 189. Irby, 597 F.3d at 1120. An Oklahoma state court has also relied on Sherrill as one of 
multiple reasons to find that land was not Indian Country. See Murphy v. State, 124 P.3d 
1198, 1206 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that a road was not Indian Country for the 
purposes of criminal jurisdiction where the only Indian ownership interest was a one-twelfth 
stake in the mineral rights beneath the land in part because considering it Indian Country 
would create the checkerboard of state and tribal jurisdiction the Court found problematic in 
Sherrill). 
 190. See 835 F.3d 1255, 1258-60, 1263 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 2328 
(2017). An earlier iteration of this case reached the Supreme Court in Hagen v. Utah, 510 
U.S. 399 (1994). 
 191. See Ute, 835 F.3d at 1263.  
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. (quoting City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 214 (2005)). 
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expressed in Osage if it were less skeptical of the alleged justifiable 
expectations of the town. 
Eschewing either position, the Western District of Michigan has held 
that Sherrill applies only to the remedial stage of a reservation 
diminishment suit. In Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. 
Snyder, the court bifurcated the case because the Tribe sought two forms of 
relief: a declaration that its reservation had not been diminished and a 
permanent injunction barring the state from asserting jurisdiction over the 
Tribe or its citizens in a manner inconsistent with federal law.194 The first 
stage would cover the question of reservation diminishment; because this 
question depended solely on congressional intent, the court awarded the 
Tribe summary judgment on the state’s Sherrill defense for this issue.195 
However, if Congress had not diminished the reservation, the court 
concluded that Sherrill and its focus on remedies could be relevant in the 
second stage to determine whether to enjoin the state from asserting 
jurisdiction on the reservation and what state activities to enjoin.196 Since 
the resolution depended on the specific equitable relief the Tribe would 
seek, the court declined at that point to adjudicate Sherrill’s application to 
this second stage.197 
3. Hunting and Fishing Treaty Rights 
Two courts have taken opposite positions on Sherrill’s application to 
treaty-based hunting and fishing rights disputes. In United States v. 
Washington, the Ninth Circuit held that Sherrill did not alter the 
longstanding rule that laches cannot diminish or render unenforceable tribal 
treaty rights.198 The State of Washington had appealed an injunction 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See 194 F. Supp. 3d 648, 650 (W.D. Mich. 2016). 
 195. See id. at 653-54. 
 196. See id. at 654-55. 
 197. See id. at 655. The court noted as an example that Sherrill would not bar an 
injunction preventing the state from interfering in Indian child custody cases; it did not 
explain why, but its citation to the Indian Child Welfare Act suggests it believed equitable 
defenses could not interfere with the congressional grant of tribal jurisdiction over such 
matters. See id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2012)). 
 198. See 853 F.3d 946, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d by an equally divided court, 138 S. 
Ct. 1832 (2018). In a subproceeding of the same action, the district court also declined to 
apply Sherrill to an intertribal dispute about the boundaries of their fishing areas because it 
involved a delay of no more than thirty-five years, during which the tribes negotiated an 
informal settlement, and because their failure to resolve their claims during the lengthy 
litigation meant their expectations were neither settled nor justifiable. See United States v. 
Washington, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1206, 1211-13 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 
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requiring it to remove culverts it built that prevented fish from moving 
freely to and from their spawning grounds in violation of tribal fishing 
rights.199 Washington contended that Sherrill’s equitable considerations 
permitted the court to find that the United States waived its treaty claims 
because it helped the state prepare a fish remediation plan and ordered 
specifically designed culverts on federally funded highways.200 The court 
rejected this argument by distinguishing Sherrill in three ways. First, 
Sherrill involved a claim to sovereignty over land within an abandoned 
reservation; the Tribes in Washington had not abandoned their 
reservations.201 Second, unlike in Sherrill, the Tribes had not relinquished 
their treaty rights in any way.202 Third, Washington and the Tribes had 
fought over fishing rights for more than a century, whereas the dispute in 
Sherrill lay dormant for almost two centuries.203 
The Northern District of Ohio implicitly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit 
in its ruling on laches in a dispute over a tribe’s exercise of hunting and 
fishing rights free from state regulation.204 On summary judgment, the court 
analyzed the state’s defense using the traditional laches factors of 
unreasonable delay and prejudice.205 The court first held that the delay 
                                                                                                                 
 199. See Washington, 853 F.3d at 954. 
 200. See id. at 966-67. 
 201. Id. at 968. 
 202. See id.  
 203. See id.; see also United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(Fletcher, J., & Gould, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (reiterating the same 
arguments), aff’d by an equally divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018). This holding inspired 
a strong dissent when the court declined to rehear the case en banc. See id. at 1030-31 
(O’Scannlain, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). The dissent rejected these three 
ways of distinguishing Sherrill. Since Sherrill clarified that laches can bar tribal treaty 
rights, they thought it irrelevant that Sherrill involved sovereignty over land and this dispute 
concerned rights appurtenant to land. See id. Nor did it matter that the Tribes had not 
acquiesced to the culverts because Washington sought to impose laches against the United 
States, whom Sherrill made subject to laches and who was an essential party to permit the 
Tribes to sue a sovereign state. See id. at 1031 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of 
Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 129 (2d Cir. 2010)). Finally, the United States delayed over thirty 
years from completion of the culverts before bringing suit, which made removal difficult and 
expensive. See id.  
 204. In dicta, the Eastern District of California has also stated that laches can apply to 
tribal treaty rights post-Sherrill. See Paiute-Shoshone Indians v. City of Los Angeles, 
No. 1:06-cv-00736 OWW LJO, 2007 WL 521403, at *25 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007).  
 205. See Ottawa Tribe v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., 541 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (N.D. Ohio 
2008), aff’d on other grounds, 577 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009). Previously, the court declined 
to resolve the Sherrill issue on a motion to dismiss because of the complicated factual 
questions involved. See Ottawa Tribe v. Speck, 447 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844-45 (N.D. Ohio 
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between the Tribe’s removal from Ohio in 1831 and its lawsuit in 2005 was 
unreasonable.206 On the prejudice prong, the court found that permitting the 
Tribe to hunt and fish free from state regulation on public lands and inland 
waters would pose a threat of injury to state park visitors.207 Further, it 
would harm wildlife refuges and hinder state conservation efforts.208 The 
court thought tribal fishing in Lake Erie would not prejudice the state 
because the lake was under-fished and the state could still regulate non-
Indian fishing.209 The court declined to read Sherrill to hold that “enforcing 
a treaty right which inhibits state sovereignty and creates a special 
sovereign status for [the Tribe] is inherently prejudicial.”210 Instead, the 
court distinguished the claim in Sherrill, which sought complete freedom 
from state and local sovereign control, from the Ottawas’ claim for “partial 
displacement of sovereign authority” over hunting and fishing rights.211 
4. Sovereign Immunity 
Finally, lower courts have disagreed over the implications of Sherrill for 
tribal sovereign immunity. This issue arose on remand in the Sherrill 
litigation in the Madison County decision. After the Court denied the OIN 
tax immunity, the Tribe sought to enjoin Madison and Oneida Counties 
from foreclosing on the parcels for nonpayment of taxes on the basis of its 
sovereign immunity from suit.212 Rejecting the counties’ argument that 
Sherrill barred the OIN from asserting sovereign immunity, the Second 
Circuit emphasized the distinction between “tribal sovereign authority over 
reservation lands and tribal sovereign immunity from suit.”213 While tax 
immunity arises from tribal sovereign authority over specific lands, 
sovereign immunity operates independently of the status of the land where 
                                                                                                                 
2006). The use of traditional laches and adjudication on summary judgment differ from the 
Second Circuit’s treatment of Sherrill arguments in tribal land claims. See supra text 
accompanying notes 113-15, 119-23.  
 206. See Ottawa, 541 F. Supp. 2d. at 976-77 (noting that the delay was unreasonable 
despite the Tribe’s lack of financial resources because the Tribe could have sued in state 
court since 1831 and federal court since at least 1966).  
 207. See id. at 978-79. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. at 979-80.  
 210. Id. at 979. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2010), 
vacated as moot and remanded, 562 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 213. Id. at 156. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/8
No. 1] SPECIAL FEATURE 275 
 
 
the relevant tribal activities occur.214 The two doctrines also developed 
separately.215 The court declined to read Sherrill as implicitly abrogating 
the sovereign immunity of the OIN simply to permit the counties to enforce 
their tax laws.216 The court observed that our legal system regularly gives 
rights without remedies and that the counties had other recourse, including 
damages suits against tribal officers, agreements with the Tribe, and 
congressional legislation.217 
The Second Circuit reaffirmed this holding in a factually 
indistinguishable suit by another New York tribe.218 Emphasizing these 
holdings, the Supreme Court in 2014 reaffirmed the “solicitous treatment of 
the common-law tribal immunity from suit—as opposed to immunity from 
other, largely prescriptive, powers of the states such as the levying of 
taxes.”219 The court reasoned that reading Sherrill to impliedly abrogate 
tribal sovereign immunity would violate the Court’s admonition that only 
Congress could do so.220  
Not all courts have agreed with the Second Circuit. At least one has held 
that tribes cannot invoke sovereign immunity where Sherrill bars immunity 
from state and local laws.221 Other judges have expressed discomfort with 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See id. at 156-58. 
 215. See id. (tracing sovereign authority to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832), and sovereign immunity to Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919)). 
 216. See id. at 159 n.8, 160. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca County, 761 F.3d 218, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam).  
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 221 (citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014)). 
New Mexico state courts have agreed with the Second Circuit for similar reasons. See 
Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe, 388 P.3d 977, 987-88 (N.M. 2016); Armijo v. 
Pueblo of Laguna, 247 P.3d 1119, 1123-24 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). A Connecticut state court 
has also suggested that Sherrill said nothing about tribal sovereign immunity. See Van 
Etten v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. KNLCV044001587, 2005 WL 3112753, 
at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2005). 
 221. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F. Supp. 2d 185, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (rejecting a tribe’s argument that sovereign immunity barred a suit by the state and 
town to enjoin it from opening a casino), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 686 F.3d 
133 (2d Cir. 2012). The Eastern District of Wisconsin arguably reached the same result in 
Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Village of Hobart. See 542 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920-21 (E.D. Wis. 
2008) (permitting the town to foreclose on property reacquired by a tribe and subject to state 
and local taxes under Sherrill). Hobart did not explicitly discuss sovereign immunity, see 
Armijo, 247 P.3d at 1124 (“[T]he basis for the decision in Hobart was sovereign authority 
not sovereign immunity.”), but the court granted summary judgment permitting the town to 
foreclose on tribal property. See Hobart, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 910. A third case, Poarch Band 
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the binding caselaw that required them to rule for tribes on this issue.222 The 
theory that Sherrill altered the law of tribal sovereign immunity rests on 
two rationales. First, the Sherrill majority disagreed with the dissent’s 
statement that the OIN could assert its tax immunity defensively in a 
foreclosure action due to the majority’s focus on the equitable nature of the 
relief, stating that “[t]he equitable cast of the relief sought remains the same 
whether asserted affirmatively or defensively.”223 One court has interpreted 
this to mean that tribes cannot assert sovereign immunity defensively when 
Sherrill bars them from exercising sovereign authority affirmatively.224 
Second, Sherrill’s holding that state and local laws apply on certain tribal 
land is meaningless without the power to enforce those laws, so Sherrill 
must have implicitly abrogated sovereign immunity.225 Even two of the 
                                                                                                                 
of Creek Indians v. Moore, also appeared to read Sherrill as holding that the OIN could not 
assert sovereign immunity in suits for nonpayment of taxes, but this reading may have 
resulted from misunderstanding the distinction between sovereign immunity from taxation 
and sovereign immunity from suit. See No. CA 15-00277-CG-C, 2016 WL 4778788, at *10 
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 2016) (noting during its discussion of tribal immunity from the 
defendant’s counterclaim that Sherrill held that the OIN “was barred from asserting 
sovereign immunity from paying city property taxes”), report and recommendation adopted 
in part and rejected in part, 2016 WL 4745185 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016). In any event, the 
court declined to apply Sherrill because it thought laches, acquiescence, and impossibility 
irrelevant to the dispute and because the counterclaim concerned trust land. See id. at *11. 
 222. See Madison County, 605 F.3d at 163-64 (Cabranes, J., concurring); Cayuga Indian 
Nation v. Seneca County, 890 F. Supp. 2d 240, 246-47 (W.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 761 F.3d 
218 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 223. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 214 n.7 (2005); see id. at 
225-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 224. Shinnecock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 298. But see Hamaatsa, 388 P.3d at 987-88 (noting 
and rejecting the argument that this language created an exception to tribal sovereign 
immunity for equitable relief). 
 225. See Hobart, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 921; Shinnecock, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 298. In addition, 
local governments have repeatedly contended that tribes cannot assert sovereign immunity in 
foreclosure suits because they are in rem proceedings. See, e.g., Seneca County, 761 F.3d at 
221; Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 229 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), 
aff’d, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated as moot and remanded, 562 U.S. 42 (2011). 
Courts have rejected this argument because foreclosure proceedings are really “suit[s] to 
take the tribe’s property,” Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 229, and sovereign immunity 
is a broad doctrine with limited exceptions, Seneca County, 761 F.3d at 220-21. But see Cass 
Cty. Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land in Highland Twp., 643 N.W.2d 685, 694 
(N.D. 2002) (rejecting the argument that the court could not adjudicate an in rem 
condemnation action over tribal fee land); Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d 
569, 573-74 (Wash. 2017) (same in an in rem quiet title suit), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1649 
(2018). This past term, the Supreme Court ruled that County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), did not hold that Indian tribes lack 
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three judges on the Madison County panel, although bound by Supreme 
Court precedent, felt it “defie[d] common sense” that a “tribe [could] 
purchase land . . . ; refuse to pay lawfully-owed taxes; and suffer no 
consequences because the taxing authority cannot sue to collect the taxes 
owed.”226 
III. Toward a Faithful Understanding of Sherrill  
As is evident from the preceding discussion, courts are in a state of 
confusion over the effect of the Sherrill decision. With significant dissent, 
the Second Circuit has interpreted Sherrill to bar all tribal land claims. The 
Tenth Circuit and the Western District of Michigan have suggested that 
Sherrill may apply to reservation diminishment cases, but the Second 
Circuit and the Eastern District of Michigan have held it does not. Courts 
are also split on whether Sherrill permits laches to apply in disputes 
concerning tribal hunting and fishing rights. Most, but not all, courts have 
declined to find that Sherrill altered the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine. 
Transcending these doctrinal areas are other conflicts about Sherrill’s 
application, such as whether its framework can apply at the pleadings stage, 
whether it requires evidentiary findings, whether the United States is 
subject to arguments based on Sherrill, and whether Sherrill is a new 
equitable defense or merely a version of traditional laches. 
All this confusion has likely arisen because Sherrill does not fit neatly 
within any preexisting doctrinal category. The Court drew on a number of 
different doctrines to support the decision, but it acknowledged that none of 
them directly governed the OIN suit for tax immunity.227 Although Sherrill 
                                                                                                                 
sovereign immunity in in rem proceedings, but it declined to address whether the common-
law immovable property exception applies to tribal sovereign immunity. See 138 S. Ct. at 
1653-54. 
 226. Madison County, 605 F.3d at 163-64 (Cabranes, J., concurring). The Northern 
District of Oklahoma rejected an argument that Sherrill could deprive tribes of another 
aspect of sovereignty: the ability to bring parens patriae suits on behalf of their members. 
See Quapaw Tribe v. Blue Tree Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175, 1190-92 (N.D. Okla. 
2009). Unlike Sherrill, which involved a tribal attempt to displace state and local 
jurisdiction, the court reasoned that the tribe in this suit brought claims under state law to 
abate environmental hazards on land over which it exercised sovereign authority. See id. at 
1192. 
 227. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 215 (noting that the Court has expressed concerns about 
non-Indian expectations “in the different, but related, context of the diminishment of an 
Indian reservation”); id. at 217 (“The principle that the passage of time can preclude relief 
has deep roots in our law, and this Court has recognized this prescription in various 
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involved tax immunity, for example, the Court did not mention its 
precedents on the topic. The decision affected the ability of the OIN to 
exercise sovereignty on its reservation pursuant to its treaty with the United 
States, but the Court did not apply traditional reservation diminishment or 
treaty rights analysis. Nor does the case fit with traditional land claim 
litigation because the OIN was not seeking ejectment or damages for its 
dispossessed land.  
Furthermore, Sherrill’s imprecise language leaves the decision 
susceptible to broad application. The Sherrill Court clearly expressed 
concerns about the delay of the OIN in bringing suit and the settled 
expectations of non-Indian landowners and state and local governments that 
the reassertion of tribal sovereignty would disrupt.228 These concerns could 
arise in practically any dispute involving Indian tribes. Because tribes fall 
outside the two-sovereign federalist structure that dominates the American 
perspective about government,229 most non-Indians probably do not think 
about tribes regularly and would be surprised if a tribe sought to exercise 
land, treaty, or sovereign rights in their neighborhoods.  
A broad application of Sherrill’s concerns about justifiable expectations 
and disruption could bar any tribal attempt to exercise its rights in a new 
way or in a way that it has not done for some time. For example, as the 
Northern District of Ohio has suggested, a tribe’s attempt to exercise 
hunting and fishing treaty rights after many years of not doing so could 
interfere with the expectations of non-Indians who are using those lands 
and waters. The exercise of these rights could also interfere with the ability 
of state and local governments to implement conservation measures.230 
Similarly, construction of a casino could cause disruption to the 
expectations of non-Indian neighbors about traffic and noise while 
hindering state and local efforts to maintain zoning and environmental 
standards.231 The varied contexts in which these concerns could apply make 
the Sherrill Court’s failure to specify the limits of its holding 
                                                                                                                 
guises.”); id. at 218 (“This Court’s original-jurisdiction state-sovereignty cases do not dictate 
a result here, but they provide a helpful point of reference . . . .”). 
 228. See Fort, supra note 113, at 380 (noting that Sherrill’s “new laches” doctrine differs 
from traditional laches in part because it focuses on “delay and disruption”). 
 229. Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that tribes cannot exercise sovereignty over those who do not consent to 
their jurisdiction because they fall outside the Constitution’s two-sovereign structure). 
 230. See supra text accompanying notes 207-08. 
 231. See supra text accompanying notes 162-72. 
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problematic.232 Therefore, the first step in making sense of how lower 
courts should apply Sherrill is to figure out what Sherrill stood for. The 
lack of doctrinal rigor in the decision makes this task difficult, but the Court 
provided four significant hints about the scope of the decision.  
First, the Court explicitly said that Sherrill did not alter the Court’s 1985 
holding in Oneida II, which permits tribes to sue for damages under federal 
common law for the unlawful dispossession of their land.233 True, Oneida II 
expressly left open the question of whether laches barred the Tribe’s 
possessory land claim.234 But Oneida II also reserved the question of 
“whether equitable considerations should limit the relief available” to the 
Tribe.235 The Sherrill opinion plainly addressed only the latter question 
concerning remedies.236 It twice mentioned that Oneida II reserved this 
question, including at the beginning of its legal analysis, and omitted any 
mention of the laches question.237 The Court strongly hinted in both Oneida 
II and Sherrill that applying equitable doctrines to bar suits for damages 
would be inappropriate,238 which suggests that Sherrill’s equitable concerns 
do not apply to the Oneida II federal common law right. The Court’s 
reaffirmance of Oneida II requires that Sherrill’s scope be understood in 
light of the common law cause of action for unlawful dispossession.  
Second, although hardly clear, Sherrill is a land claim case, not one 
primarily about sovereignty. In subsequent sovereignty disputes, litigants 
hoping to apply Sherrill have repeatedly argued that the decision concerned 
                                                                                                                 
 232. The fact that the Court created the Sherrill doctrine without briefing from the parties 
and amici on the specific issue it ultimately decided may partially explain its failure to 
anticipate and limit the consequences of this new doctrine. See supra note 54. 
 233. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005). 
 234. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2005); see also 
Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 244-45 (1985) (refusing to rule on the petitioners’ laches argument 
because they did not raise it at the Second Circuit). 
 235. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 253 n.27.  
 236. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 209, 213. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. at 221 n.14 (“[A]pplication of a nonstatutory time limitation in an action for 
damages would be ‘novel.’” (quoting Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 244 n.16)); Oneida II, 470 U.S. 
at 244 n.16 (suggesting, but not deciding, that laches would not bar the OIN’s claim for 
damages because laches do not apply to actions at law or fit with Indians’ ward status, 
federal policy supporting tribal land claims, and the requirement of a congressional act to 
extinguish tribal sovereignty); cf. Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 290 (Hall, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (relying on these statements from Sherrill and Oneida II to argue that 
“Sherrill limits the application of the equitable defense of laches to the award of forward-
looking, disruptive equitable relief”). 
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sovereignty and treaty rights.239 In support of this argument, Justice Scalia 
suggested at the Parker oral argument that Sherrill held that the OIN did 
not have sovereignty over their repurchased parcels.240 Tribes and the 
federal government have responded by arguing that Sherrill has no 
application to most sovereignty disputes because it concerned a remedy for 
the unlawful dispossession of the OIN land.241  
The Sherrill decision does not explicitly resolve this debate, but a close 
reading demonstrates the tribes are correct. At Sherrill’s core is a concern 
about whether a revival of tribal sovereignty is an appropriate remedy for 
the Oneida II common law right of action.242 This is clear from the 
beginning of the opinion’s legal analysis, where the Court acknowledged 
the Oneida II right and then stated that the Tribe could not reassert tax 
immunity as a remedy for this violation.243 The Court reiterated throughout 
Sherrill that it was addressing a remedy for the Oneida II right.244 While the 
OIN sought to assert sovereignty on its reservation, the underlying right 
concerned New York’s unlawful dispossession of tribal lands. The Court’s 
repeated references to the “ancient” wrong reinforce this conclusion;245 only 
the unlawful dispossession occurring in the late 1700s and early 1800s, and 
not the sovereignty dispute arising in the late 1990s, could be considered an 
                                                                                                                 
 239. See, e.g., Brief of Oklahoma Farm Bureau, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance at 21-22, Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5050); 
Brief of Defendant-Appellee Director of Ohio Department of Natural Resources at 37-38, 
Ottawa Tribe v. Logan, 577 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-3621), 2008 WL 6123204; 
State’s Brief in Opposition to Tribe’s Combined Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Defenses or Rule 26(b) Limit Discovery at 15-16, Little 
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Snyder, 194 F. Supp. 3d 648 (W.D. Mich. 2016) 
(No. 1:15-cv-850).  
 240. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) 
(No. 14-1406), 2016 WL 524813. 
 241. See, e.g., Opening Brief of Appellant at 53, Osage, 597 F.3d 1117 (No. 09-5050), 
2009 WL 2429151; Reply Brief of Appellant Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma at 26, Ottawa 
Tribe v. Logan, 577 F.3d 634 (No. 08-3621), 2009 WL 1420918. 
 242. But see Singel & Fletcher, supra note 87, at 46 (suggesting that Sherrill was not a 
land case, at least not in the same way as Oneida I and Oneida II). 
 243. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213-14. 
 244. See, e.g., id. at 202 (“Our 1985 decision recognized that the Oneidas could maintain 
a federal common-law claim for damages for ancient wrongdoing in which both national and 
state governments were complicit. Today, we decline to protect redress for the Tribe into the 
present and future . . . .”); id. at 221 (“[T]he question of damages for the Tribe’s ancient 
dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in 
Oneida II. However, [the facts of the case] render inequitable the piecemeal shift in 
governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.”).  
 245. E.g., id. at 216 n.11, 221. 
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“ancient” wrong.246 The Court also relied most directly on two cases 
involving Indian land claims: Felix v. Patrick and Yankton Sioux Tribe of 
Indians v. United States.247 Finally, Sherrill’s application of equitable 
defenses fits much better in the context of a remedy for the Oneida II right 
rather than a sovereignty or treaty violation. It would be radical to apply 
equitable defenses to bar an Indian treaty right, which only Congress can 
abrogate.248 The Court is free, however, to craft defenses to a common law 
right of action.249 
Third, Sherrill’s analysis centered on the distinction between rights and 
remedies. The Court explicitly recognized this distinction250 and stressed 
that equitable considerations barred only the specific relief the OIN sought, 
not its entire claim.251 This focus on remedies follows from the 
reaffirmance of Oneida II and the emphasis on the underlying land claim. 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Cf. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL 
4808823, at *22 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2008) (distinguishing a reservation diminishment 
dispute from Sherrill in part by noting that, while Sherrill concerned an ancient wrong from 
over two centuries earlier, the dispute at issue developed incrementally with the state’s 
assumption of jurisdiction); Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 12 (noting two 
timeframes for the claim in Sherrill: a long-standing dispute with New York from the 1700s 
and a new dispute arising when the OIN first repurchased its land).  
 247. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217-19; see also Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1926) (involving a tribe’s suit over title and possession to a 
tract of land in Minnesota); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 318-19 (1892) (involving a tribal 
member’s heirs’ suit to establish a constructive trust over lands allegedly fraudulently 
conveyed to the defendants). 
 248. See infra text accompanying note 287. 
 249. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 240-50, 253 n.27 (1985) (rejecting the relevance 
of a number of defenses to the common law right of action for unlawful dispossession and 
reserving the question of whether equitable defenses could bar certain forms of relief). In 
Saginaw Chippewa, the court noted that the Sherrill Court was “reasonably, indeed 
necessarily, involved in the task of fashioning a remedy” for a Nonintercourse Act violation 
because Congress did not specify one. See 2008 WL 4808823, at *22. This is not completely 
accurate, as Oneida II recognized a federal common law right for unlawful dispossession, 
not an implied cause of action under the Nonintercourse Act. See Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 233. 
But it is certainly correct that the Court had the authority and responsibility to shape 
remedies for that common law right. 
 250. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213.  
 251. See, e.g., id. at 216-17 (stating that the long delay in bringing suit and the changes to 
the region “preclude[d] OIN from gaining the disruptive remedy it now seeks” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 215 n.9 (“The relief OIN seeks . . . is unavailable . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
see also Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 288-89 (2d Cir. 2005) (Hall, J., 
dissenting) (collecting quotations that demonstrate that “the clear language of City of Sherrill 
confines its holding to the use of laches to bar certain relief, not to bar a claim or all 
remedies”).  
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The Court was simply evaluating a remedy for the OIN’s Oneida II right 
that sought to revive tribal sovereignty. Justice Souter’s concurrence 
bolsters this reading of Sherrill. If he had to write separately to explain that 
inaction of the OIN was “central to the very claims of right,”252 the majority 
opinion must have held that equitable considerations barred only the OIN’s 
requested remedy. 
Finally, the Court’s primary concern with the OIN’s request for tax 
immunity was the risk of future disruption from granting a remedy that 
permitted the Tribe to assert sovereignty. The Court worried that granting 
this remedy would “project redress . . . into the present and future” and 
“have disruptive practical consequences.”253 The Court seemingly treated 
all exercises of tribal sovereignty identically,254 but it was plainly focused 
on the forward-looking remedy that would have permitted the Tribe to 
assert its sovereignty, not on the retrospective damages award the Court 
authorized in Oneida II. 
Putting these four core aspects of Sherrill together demonstrates the 
narrow scope of the opinion. The Court was solely concerned about the 
disruptive consequences of a remedy in land claim litigation that would 
                                                                                                                 
 252. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 222 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 253. Id. at 202, 219 (majority opinion); accord id. at 215 n.9 (“The relief OIN seeks . . . 
is unavailable because of . . . the present-day and future disruption such relief would 
engender.”); id. at 219 (rejecting the “unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian 
sovereign control”). 
 254. Although the Second Circuit has taken its inherent disruption rule too far, see infra 
Part IV.A, the Sherrill opinion could be read to support an all-or-nothing approach to 
evaluating assertions of sovereignty. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202-03, 219-20 (stating that 
the OIN could not “unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part,” 
evaluating the disruption of the OIN’s requested tax immunity based on risks of exemptions 
from other state and local regulations, and not providing factual support for its conclusory 
belief that granting the OIN tax immunity would be disruptive). Some courts have adopted 
this approach and thus failed to use factual evidence to support their conclusion that tribal 
sovereignty would cause disruption, see supra text accompanying notes 158-62 (noting that 
the courts in Union Springs and Aurelius simply assumed that building casinos in violation 
of local zoning laws would be disruptive), or evaluated whether to permit a tribe to exercise 
its sovereignty based on the most disruptive possible use of the land, see supra text 
accompanying notes 163-72 (noting this approach in Shinnecock). Although the Sherrill 
Court may have thought the OIN’s assertion of sovereignty in a heavily non-Indian area 
following its removal from New York two centuries earlier was so disruptive that the 
specific way in which the OIN sought to exercise its sovereignty was irrelevant (and thus 
might have evaluated the disruptive effects of the specific exercise of sovereignty under 
more tribe-friendly facts), this is only speculation. But see infra note 319 (arguing that 
Sherrill’s all-or-nothing approach is misguided and that the Court should replace that 
approach with a more fact-specific analysis of disruption).  
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permit a tribe to revive its sovereignty over the land. These concerns 
centered on this forward-looking remedy relating to exercises of tribal 
sovereignty and did not affect the Oneida II cause of action for damages 
stemming from unlawful dispossession. Although the decision sought to 
protect non-Indian justifiable expectations in the context of remedies for 
this particular cause of action, it did not elevate these expectations above 
tribal rights completely, especially not outside of the land claim context.  
IV. Evaluating Sherrill’s Applications in the Lower Courts 
This understanding of Sherrill is key to evaluating how lower courts 
have interpreted and applied the decision. As described in Part II, some 
courts have adopted the focus in Sherrill on disruption to non-Indian 
expectations in order to alter established doctrine in tribal land claim and 
sovereignty litigation. These courts have not remained faithful to Sherrill’s 
underlying principles and concerns. As a land claim case involving a unique 
prospective remedy seeking to permit the exercise of tribal sovereignty, 
Sherrill’s application beyond its facts should be limited. Section IV.A 
explains how the Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule barring all tribal 
land claims ignores the intact common law right from Oneida II and the 
focus in Sherrill on prospective, disruptive remedies. Part IV.B then 
demonstrates that courts are wrong to apply Sherrill to sovereignty disputes 
because those disputes involve claims of sovereignty as the primary right, 
not just the remedy, and raise less acute concerns about disruption to non-
Indian justifiable expectations.  
A. Tribal Land Claims 
The Second Circuit has derived from Sherrill an inherent disruption rule 
that bars all land claims regardless of the remedy sought by the tribe.255 
This approach is incompatible with Sherrill itself. Most fundamentally, the 
inherent disruption rule ignores that the Supreme Court has decided that 
tribes are entitled to damages for their land claims. The on-point precedent 
is Oneida II, not Sherrill. The Court’s reaffirmance of Oneida II in Sherrill 
means that tribes are still entitled to pursue at least claims for damages for 
unlawful dispossession, and the Second Circuit cannot simply overrule 
Oneida II through a convoluted interpretation of Sherrill. To the contrary, 
the Court’s statement in Oneida II that, although “[o]ne would have thought 
that claims dating back for more than a century and a half would have been 
barred long ago . . . , neither petitioners nor we have found any applicable 
                                                                                                                 
 255. See supra Section II.A.1. 
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statute of limitations or other relevant legal basis for holding that the 
[Tribe’s] claims are barred” is still good law.256 
The inherent disruption rule overlooks the fundamental distinction 
between rights and remedies in Sherrill. The inherent disruption bar on all 
tribal land claims regardless of remedy contradicts Sherrill’s explicit focus 
on the specific remedy the OIN sought. The Second Circuit in Cayuga 
declared that Sherrill primarily concerned “the disruptive nature of the 
claim itself,” but it failed to justify this interpretation: The three quotations 
it pulled from Sherrill all refer to disruption from the OIN’s desired 
remedy, not its entire claim.257 The Second Circuit’s categorical ban on 
tribal land claims is thus inconsistent with the pragmatic focus on remedies 
in Sherrill. 
This approach also renders meaningless Sherrill’s concern about present 
and future consequences of recognizing tribal sovereignty. In barring 
monetary damages, the court has ignored that “the essence of compensatory 
damages” is “to restore the injured party as nearly as possible to the 
position he would have been in but for the wrong.”258 Money damages are a 
purely retrospective remedy that focus not on future consequences, but 
instead on rectifying past wrongful conduct.259 Thus, damages for a land 
claim redress the past harm the tribe has suffered while not altering the 
present or future ownership and governance of the land, which were the 
concern in Sherrill. If money damages trigger Sherrill’s concern about 
present and future consequences, it is difficult to imagine a remedy that 
does not.260 Again, the Second Circuit’s approach turns Sherrill into a 
                                                                                                                 
 256. Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 253 (1985); see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of 
Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (Gershon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (criticizing the majority for “foreclos[ing] the Oneidas from obtaining any remedy” 
despite recognition of their common law right in Oneida II). Two cases the Sherrill Court 
relied on for their equitable considerations also explicitly stated that tribes are entitled to 
monetary damages in land claims. See Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 272 
U.S. 351, 359 (1926); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 334 (1892). 
 257. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 258. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 14 (4th ed. 2010); accord 1-1 
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.01 (2017); 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64.1 (4th ed. 
2017). 
 259. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (listing “money 
damages” as the quintessential “retrospective relief”); Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21-22 
(1999) (per curiam) (distinguishing the “retrospective” relief of damages with “forward-
looking . . . injunctive relief”). 
 260. See Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 290 n.13 (Hall, J., dissenting). Although all damages 
remedies are retrospective, the Second Circuit’s holding in County of Oneida that even a fair 
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doctrine about rights even though the Court explicitly stated it was 
addressing remedies. The concern about present and future consequences in 
Sherrill thus requires distinguishing between more disruptive, prospective, 
equitable remedies, such as injunctions, and less disruptive, retrospective, 
legal remedies, such as damages.261  
Moreover, remedies like declaratory relief and damages do not trigger 
Sherrill’s concerns about disruption in the same way as an assertion of 
sovereignty. A declaratory judgment against the state for illegally 
purchasing tribal land declares legal rights but does not require or prohibit 
action262 and cannot lead to contempt;263 thus, although a declaratory 
judgment may be prospective, it does not have practical consequences for 
non-Indian landowners. Similarly, damages compensate the tribe for prior 
injury and do not change governance in the area going forward.264 These 
remedies may be “disruptive” in the literal sense that they alter the status 
quo; this reasoning, however, would label as disruptive any litigation 
remedy in any suit, which would conflict with Sherrill’s focus on the 
specific remedy at issue. The Second Circuit has stated that these remedies 
throw into doubt the validity of current land ownership,265 but the pragmatic 
principles of Sherrill permit courts to fashion remedies to prevent 
unjustified disruptions while also providing justice for tribes. If a court 
                                                                                                                 
compensation claim seeking adequate consideration for a two-centuries-old land sale is 
forward-looking is especially nonsensical. 
 261. See id. at 289-90. Of course, not all equitable remedies are forward-looking. A 
constructive trust, for example, is an equitable remedy that redresses past misconduct. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 (AM. LAW. INST. 
2011). An explanation of Sherrill’s applicability to all types of remedies is beyond the scope 
of this Article, but the prospective or retrospective nature of the remedy, not its status as 
equitable or legal, appears dispositive. 
 262. See 22A AM. JUR. 2D DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 1 (West 2017). 
 263. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974) (“[A declaratory judgment] is a 
much milder form of relief than an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is not 
ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is not contempt.” 
(quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part))).  
 264. New York has repeatedly argued that large damage awards would be disruptive 
because they would significantly impact state and local budgets. See, e.g., Brief for 
Respondents in Opposition at 24, United States v. New York, 565 U.S. 970 (No. 10-1404), 
2011 WL 3010263. The higher the damages, however, the more serious the injury the tribe 
has suffered. It is perverse to permit the state to avoid any remedy for its unlawful actions 
simply because the wrongdoing was so substantial. 
 265. See supra text accompanying note 106, 112.  
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awarded damages and the tribe returned to court to eject landowners, for 
example, the court could deny ejectment as too disruptive under Sherrill.266 
The Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule goes beyond a faithful 
reading of Sherrill by barring claims brought by the United States.267 The 
Second Circuit has failed to justify why tribal land claims are not subject to 
the rule that delay-based equitable defenses cannot bar the United States’ 
claims.268 Most confusing is the court’s position that the United States acts 
on behalf of a private party when it intervenes in tribal land claims. As 
other courts have recognized, the United States has a sovereign interest both 
as trustee for tribes269 and in enforcing treaties and federal statutes, like the 
                                                                                                                 
 266. Relativity of title would prevent anyone else from seeking to eject landowners on 
the basis of their faulty title. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 160 (6th ed. 2014) (“[O]ne who does not have legal title to the 
land may still protect her rights against a later intruder.”); 90 N.Y. JUR. 2D Real Property-
Possessory Actions § 346 (West 2017) (“The plaintiff in an action to recover real property 
must recover, if at all, upon the strength of his or her own title, and not upon the weakness of 
the title of his or her adversary . . . .”). The argument that granting tribes certain 
nondisruptive remedies would throw modern land ownership into chaos also incorrectly 
assumes that property rights are an all-or-nothing proposition. As aboriginal title makes 
clear, American real property law often divides property rights among multiple parties. See 
Singer, supra note 98, at 45 (rejecting Cayuga’s reasoning because aboriginal title 
demonstrates that it is “nonsense” to argue that only one person can have title to land at once 
and noting that “[r]ecognizing Indian title within the state of New York would not 
necessarily mean that longstanding non-Indian possessors would not own their homes or not 
be able to get mortgages” because courts “could define the relative rights of Indian nations 
and non-Indian possessors in a way that protected the reliance interests of the non-Indian 
possessors while vindicating tribal title”). 
 267. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32. 
 268. See Fort, supra note 113, at 388-99. 
 269. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 
No. EDCV 13-883 JGB (SPx), 2016 WL 2621301, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016); Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL 4808823, at *23 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 22, 2008); Fort, supra note 113, at 397; see also United States v. Minnesota, 270 
U.S. 181, 194 (1926) (noting the United States’ interest “as a sovereign” in a suit to recover 
land wrongly issued to Minnesota instead of a tribe because of “its guardianship over the 
Indians” and “its right to . . . remov[e] unlawful obstacles to the fulfillment of its 
obligations”); Ute Indian Tribe v. Myton, 835 F.3d 1255, 1263 (10th Cir. 2016) (doubting 
that Sherrill could justify stripping Indian Country status from trust land because “laches is a 
line of defense that usually may not be asserted against the United States”), cert. dismissed, 
137 S. Ct. 2328 (2017); cf. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 174 
(2011) (“The difference between a private common-law trust and the statutory Indian trust 
follows from the unique position of the Government as sovereign.”). 
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Nonintercourse Act.270 In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that 
the United States has a sovereign interest in securing redress for a transfer 
of Indian land in violation of federal law.271 Sherrill did not alter this 
doctrine whatsoever. The United States was not a party, and the case did 
not involve trust land or even turn on the treaties between the OIN and the 
federal government.272 
Finally, Sherrill did not change the favorable federal policy toward tribal 
land claims, which the inherent disruption rule ignores. This policy began 
with the Nonintercourse Act, in which Congress promised to protect Indian 
land holdings. Although the United States has not always lived up to its 
promise,273 the intervention of the federal government in a number of 
Second Circuit land claims shows that it believes tribes are entitled to a 
remedy. In enacting the Indian Claims Limitation Act (ICLA) to govern 
tribal land claims, Congress exhibited a desire to permit tribes to pursue 
these claims, subject to certain restrictions, because it thought the United 
States had not adequately protected tribal interests.274 Though it expressed 
                                                                                                                 
 270. See Saginaw Chippewa, 2008 WL 4808823, at *23. In County of Oneida, the 
Second Circuit seemed to acknowledge the United States’ “own interest in the vindication of 
a federal statute,” but said the same was true in Cayuga. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of 
Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 129 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 271. See Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 438 (1912) (noting that an unlawful 
allotment transfer was not “simply a violation of the proprietary rights of the Indian” but 
also a violation of “the governmental rights of the United States”). 
 272. See Agua Caliente, 2016 WL 2621301, at *4. Nor does the allegedly egregious 
delay in bringing suit or the fact that Congress only enacted a statute of limitations for land 
claim actions by the United States in 1966 make laches applicable in this context. See supra 
text accompanying note 131. When Congress provided a statute of limitations for the claims 
of the United States, it restarted the clock for any already accrued actions, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2415(g) (2012), demonstrating an intent to permit the United States to pursue “ancient” 
land claims.  
 273. See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 205-06 (2005) 
(recognizing that the federal government played an important role in facilitating the removal 
of the Oneidas from New York in the early 1800s). 
 274. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415; Oneida II, 470 U.S. 226, 240-44 (1985) (noting that the 
statute demonstrates congressional “concern that the United States had failed to live up to its 
responsibilities as trustee for the Indians”). The Second Circuit litigation has produced 
significant debate over whether ICLA set a statute of limitations for tribal land claims. 
Compare Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21-22, United States v. New York, 565 U.S. 970 
(2011) (No. 10-1404), 2011 WL 1881816 (arguing that, because 28 U.S.C. § 2415 set a 
statute of limitations for the OIN land claim that had not run, the Second Circuit’s 
application of laches to bar the claim was inappropriate), with Brief for Respondents in 
Opposition, supra note 264, at 27-28 (arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2415 did not set a statute of 
limitations for the OIN land claim). This debate is beyond the scope of this Article, but at the 
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concern about one specific remedy, Sherrill did not undermine the 
favorable policy toward tribal land claims generally.275 
Properly understood, Sherrill’s application to tribal land claims should 
be limited to barring courts from issuing equitable relief that permits tribes 
to exercise sovereignty after many years of delay in heavily non-Indian 
communities. Courts should still award monetary damages and declaratory 
relief to tribes for the unlawful dispossession of their land.  
How should courts evaluate arguments based on Sherrill in tribal land 
claims cases? Courts should not rule on the pleadings, as they do under 
Second Circuit precedent, because Sherrill only applies to certain 
remedies.276 Instead, courts should rely on evidence submitted by the 
parties to determine whether the length of delay, size of the non-Indian 
population, and level of non-Indian development trigger the same concerns 
of disruption to non-Indian expectations that animated Sherrill.277 The 
Second Circuit has not directly addressed whether these factors make a 
difference because every case it has adjudicated concerned similar facts to 
                                                                                                                 
very least ICLA demonstrated congressional intent that time-based defenses should not bar 
all such claims. See, e.g., Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 244 (“[W]e think the statutory framework 
adopted in 1982 presumes the existence of an Indian right of action not otherwise subject to 
any statute of limitations.”). The Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule, which effectively 
bars all tribal land claims, contradicts this congressional intent. 
 275. The Second Circuit justified its inherent disruption rule in Cayuga in part by saying 
that doctrines applicable in other areas of law do not always apply to tribal land claims. See 
supra text accompanying note 107. As Judge Hall noted forcefully in dissent, courts treat 
tribal claims differently to provide tribes with “more protection, rather than less, as a result 
of strong federal policy protecting tribal title from application of state law.” See Cayuga 
Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 283 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (Hall, J., dissenting); cf. 
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 846 (1982) (“We have 
consistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations relating to tribes and tribal 
activities must be ‘construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of 
[Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 
(1980))). 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15. The standards for both motions to 
dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings permit courts to throw out a case only 
when the plaintiff’s factual allegations do not plausibly support a claim that the defendant 
acted unlawfully. See, e.g., Concord Assocs., L.P. v. Entm’t Props. Tr., 817 F.3d 46, 52 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (motion to dismiss); Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2012) (motion 
for judgment on the pleadings). 
 277. On summary judgment, courts can evaluate submitted evidence for this information, 
instead of relying on judicial notice like the Second Circuit currently does. See supra text 
accompanying notes 116-18. 
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Sherrill.278 Given its emphasis on the inherent disruption of tribal land 
claims,279 the Second Circuit may disagree with Canadian St. Regis that 
these factors are relevant in determining whether Sherrill applies.280 
However, the reason the Sherrill Court thought the assertion of tribal 
sovereignty would be a disruptive remedy was the lengthy period after 
dispossession before the OIN brought suit and the mostly non-Indian 
modern population.281 An exercise of tribal sovereignty in a predominantly 
Indian area or after a shorter period of time does not risk disruption to non-
Indian expectations in the same way. 
B. Sovereignty  
As discussed above, lower courts have considered Sherrill’s application 
to a broad range of sovereignty disputes. What is clear is that the courts in 
Union Springs and Aurelius correctly deemed Sherrill relevant to tribal 
attempts to build casinos in violation of local zoning laws. Centuries after 
dispossession, the tribes in both cases were attempting to reassert 
sovereignty over land purchased within a historic reservation, just like in 
Sherrill. The Sherrill Court explicitly mentioned these cases as examples of 
its concern about disruption to non-Indian justifiable expectations.282 Yet 
most sovereignty disputes do not fit this unusual paradigm. Courts can 
easily distinguish these disputes from Sherrill on the ground that Sherrill 
was the Court’s response to an unusual remedy for a tribal land claim.283 
But beyond this distinction (and largely because of it), Sherrill’s concerns 
about disruption to justifiable expectations simply do not fit within the 
contexts of reservation diminishment, hunting and fishing treaty rights, or 
                                                                                                                 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 133-44. 
 279. See Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 280. See supra text accompanying notes 151-57 (describing how the Northern District of 
New York in Canadian St. Regis determined that Sherrill should not apply to tribal land 
claims involving a delay of only forty years or an area with a majority modern Indian 
population).  
 281. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 202-03, 214-15, 216-17, 
221 (2005). 
 282. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62. Although these cases seem to interpret 
Sherrill correctly, this result conflicts squarely with federal policy. Under IGRA, tribes may 
pursue class II gaming on their reservations without interference from states. See 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 2703(4), 2710(b) (2012). As long as the reservations were not diminished, this clear 
federal policy to permit tribes to pursue self-determination and economic development in the 
context of gaming leaves no place for Sherrill’s equitable concerns. See id. § 2702(1) (noting 
that one purpose of IGRA was to “promot[e] tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, 
and strong tribal governments”). 
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 237-47. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
290 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
 
tribal sovereign immunity. The Court has clear doctrine in all of these areas 
that do not mention Sherrill. These doctrines either already incorporate 
concerns about justifiable non-Indian expectations or do not account for 
those concerns for logical reasons. There is thus no reason to deem Sherrill 
an independent way to extinguish tribal sovereign rights. 
1. Sovereign Treaty Disputes: Reservation Diminishment and Hunting 
and Fishing Rights 
Current analyses of Sherrill’s application to sovereign treaty disputes do 
not sufficiently distinguish between two related but distinct issues that arise 
in these cases. These two issues involve the questions of right and remedy 
that were central in Sherrill. The first issue is whether the tribe still 
possesses a sovereign treaty right or whether Congress has diminished the 
reservation or abrogated other treaty rights. Assuming the sovereign treaty 
right still exists, the second issue involves fashioning a remedy that permits 
or prohibits the tribe from exercising sovereignty in a certain way. 
Although courts often merge these two issues, they are conceptually 
distinct.284 Only the Western District of Michigan in Little Traverse has 
explicitly recognized this distinction.285 Ultimately, Sherrill may not apply 
to either question, but because the relevant considerations for each issue are 
different, it is important to recognize the conceptual distinction.286 
Within this framework, Sherrill plainly does not apply to the first 
question of whether the tribe has a sovereign treaty right. The Court has 
made clear that the power to abrogate Indian treaty rights rests only with 
                                                                                                                 
 284. See Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1082 (2016) (“Because petitioners have 
raised only the single question of [reservation] diminishment, we express no view about 
whether equitable considerations of laches and acquiescence may curtail the Tribe’s power 
to tax the retailers of Pender . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Brief for the United States at 53-54, 
Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (No. 14-1406), 2015 WL 9181061 (stating that the reservation 
diminishment issue is “both analytically distinct from and logically prior to the question 
whether the Tribe may exercise jurisdiction over non-members within the Reservation’s 
borders once those borders are properly understood”); cf. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca 
County, 260 F. Supp. 3d 290, 314-15 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (refusing to consider a Sherrill 
argument for a reservation diminishment counterclaim against the tribe because “[t]he 
existence of a reservation, sovereign authority over land, and laches are three distinct issues, 
of which the counterclaim mentions only the first”). 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 194-97.  
 286. Among other errors, merging these issues leads to the faulty argument that Sherrill, 
by barring the OIN from exercising tax immunity over its lands, must have found its 
reservation disestablished. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18-19, Upstate 
Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States, No. 16-1320 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017). 
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Congress.287 Congress must use “clear and plain” language to abrogate 
Indian treaty rights, which “are too fundamental to be easily cast aside.”288 
And, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in United States v. Washington, laches 
and other equitable defenses cannot defeat Indian treaty rights.289 Applying 
Sherrill’s equitable consideration to abolish tribal hunting and fishing rights 
would contravene these established principles and intrude on congressional 
plenary power over tribes.  
Since the right to exercise sovereignty over a reservation is one type of 
treaty right,290 this same logic applies to reservation diminishment cases. 
The “well settled” Solem test focuses solely on whether Congress has 
clearly manifested an intent to diminish reservation boundaries.291 Leaving 
no room for doubt, the Court has reiterated that “only Congress can divest a 
reservation of its land and diminish its boundaries.”292 Although the Court 
has sometimes used imprecise language suggesting that reservation 
                                                                                                                 
 287. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687 (1993); United States v. 
Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986); see also Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 424, 436 (1928) (stating that abrogating treaties and statutes are 
“political, not judicial, powers”); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) 
(“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress 
from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be 
controlled by the judicial department of the government.”). 
 288. Dion, 476 U.S. at 738-39; accord Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999). 
 289. 157 F.3d 630, 649 (9th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 
U.S. 494, 533 (1900) (“We are not at liberty to dispense with any of the conditions or 
requirements of the treaty, or to take away any qualification or integral part of any 
stipulation, upon any notion of equity or general convenience, or substantial justice.”). 
 290. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (stating 
the question at issue as “whether Congress intended by the 1894 Act to modify the 
reservation set aside for the Yankton Tribe in the 1858 Treaty”). The subsequent discussion 
applies to the typical diminishment claim concerning a reservation secured by treaty. But 
similar principles would apply to a diminishment claim about a reservation set aside via 
executive order. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 185, 
§ 15.04(4), at 1012-13 (explaining the legal status of executive order reservations). Only 
Congress has the power to alter the boundaries of executive order reservations, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 398d (2012) (“Changes in the boundaries of reservations created by Executive order . . . 
for the use and occupation of Indians shall not be made except by Act of Congress.”), so 
courts cannot base diminishment decisions on fear of disruption to non-Indian expectations. 
 291. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078-79 (2016). 
 292. Id. (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984)); accord Yankton Sioux, 
522 U.S. at 343. 
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diminishment can occur through demographic change,293 the Court has 
never adopted this approach. Since only Congress can diminish a 
reservation, Sherrill’s judicially-created equitable doctrine has no place in 
the inquiry.294 
The Court confirmed this analysis in 2016 in its Nebraska v. Parker 
decision by reaffirming, with no mention of Sherrill, that reservation 
diminishment is solely a question of congressional intent.295 This 
reaffirmation of the Solem test is significant in light of two arguments made 
in the case: 1) Nebraska’s argument that the Court should alter the test to 
emphasize modern demographics and jurisdictional history296 and 2) an 
argument from amici that under Sherrill “a tribe may lose sovereign control 
over ancient reservation land, regardless of congressional intent, when that 
area has long been regulated, governed, and populated by non-Indian 
inhabitants.”297 Although the Court ended the Parker opinion by leaving 
open the question of whether Sherrill could bar the tribe from taxing non-
Indian businesses on the reservation,298 this statement concerned not the 
                                                                                                                 
 293. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 356 (“Where non-Indian settlers flooded into 
the opened portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian character, we 
have acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred.” (quoting 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471)). 
 294. See Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2008 WL 
4808823, at *23 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2008); cf. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 
U.S. 197, 224-25 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for “do[ing] what 
only Congress may do” by “effectively proclaim[ing] a diminishment of the Tribe’s 
reservation”).  
 295. See Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1078-79. 
 296. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 23-24, Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (No. 14-1406), 2015 
WL 7294863 (arguing that the area’s “demographic and jurisdictional history . . . 
necessitates a finding of de facto diminishment” to avoid “seriously disrupt[ing] the 
justifiable expectations of the people living in the area” (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 
339, 421 (1994))). 
 297. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Village of Hobart and Pender Public Schools in 
Support of Petitioners at 7, Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (No. 14-1406), 2015 WL 7450416. In 
addition to the local school district, the brief was filed by the Village of Hobart in 
Wisconsin, which has fought with the Oneidas over its attempts to regulate activity on their 
land. See, e.g., Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Village of Hobart, 732 F.3d 837, 838, 842 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (affirming a grant of summary judgment to the Oneidas on their claim that the 
Village could not assess storm water management fees on tribal land); Oneida Nation v. 
Village of Hobart, No. 16-C-1217, 2017 WL 4773299, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 23, 2017) 
(resolving burden of proof issues in the Oneidas’ suit to prevent the Village from enforcing a 
special events ordinance on tribal land).  
 298. See Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1082. 
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initial question of diminishment but the second issue of what sovereignty 
the tribe could exercise on its undiminished reservation.  
Nothing in Sherrill altered the established principle that only Congress 
can abrogate treaty rights or diminish a reservation. As a land claim 
decision, Sherrill said nothing about sovereign treaty rights whatsoever. 
The Court stated that its decision did not address the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of the Treaty of Buffalo Creek or the question of reservation 
diminishment. In doing so, the Court explicitly recognized that only 
Congress can diminish a reservation.299 Sherrill’s focus on remedies also 
makes it inapplicable to questions about treaty rights: While Sherrill 
evaluated an assertion of tribal sovereignty as a remedy in a land claim, 
treaty cases involve assertions of tribal sovereignty as the primary right. As 
such, district courts have consistently held that Sherrill did not alter the 
Second Circuit’s holding that Congress has not disestablished the Oneida 
Reservation.300 The interpretive gymnastics required to read Sherrill to 
permit courts to alter treaty rights are especially inappropriate given that 
“treaties enjoy a unique position in our law.”301 
The second issue left open in Parker is more difficult than the initial 
question of whether Sherrill altered tribal sovereign rights. As the Western 
District of Michigan suggested in Little Traverse, it would be theoretically 
sound for a court to find that Congress has not abrogated a treaty right but 
then fashion a remedy that limits how the tribe can exercise that right. 
Because of Sherrill’s emphasis on prospective remedies and judicial 
discretion in fashioning equitable relief, concerns about future disruption fit 
better at the remedial stage, even in the context of tribal treaty rights.302 
Accordingly, litigants have argued that the exercise of certain tribal treaty 
rights is as, if not more, disruptive of non-Indian justifiable expectations 
than the tax immunity at issue in Sherrill. Tribal reassertions of sovereignty 
over reservations may disrupt settled expectations by creating a 
                                                                                                                 
 299. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 215 n.9; see also id. at 215 (referring to the “context of the 
diminishment of an Indian reservation” as “different” from the situation at issue). 
 300. See cases cited supra notes 174-77. 
 301. United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 649 (9th Cir. 1998). A similar analysis 
shows that Sherrill does not permit courts to extinguish aboriginal title even where that title 
is not secured by treaty, such as in the Shinnecock casino litigation. Just like with treaties, 
extinguishment of aboriginal title is within the “supreme” power of Congress, United 
States v. Santa Fe. Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941), and thus not within the purview 
of the courts. 
 302. See Washington, 157 F.3d at 650-51 (finding that, although the court could not use 
equitable considerations to interpret Indian treaties, it could do so to craft remedies based on 
those treaties). 
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checkerboard of jurisdiction and complicated governance issues.303 For 
example, the inability of state and local governments to enforce public 
safety regulations, such as fire codes and environmental laws, on tribal 
lands within reservations could jeopardize the safety of non-Indian 
communities and their ability to govern themselves.304 Recognizing tribal 
sovereignty could cause substantial litigation because non-Indians have no 
other method of influencing tribal governments.305 From this perspective, 
these concerns are most acute when the population is heavily non-Indian 
and state and local governments have exercised jurisdiction over tribal 
lands for decades.306 
Despite its superficial logic, this argument fails to acknowledge that 
Sherrill’s concerns about disruption were intimately tied to the land claim 
context in which the dispute arose. A broad application of Sherrill to 
sovereignty disputes would require interpreting the decision not just as 
crafting a remedy for a land claim, but instead expressing general concern 
about disruptive tribal activity.307 Sherrill, however, expressly emphasized 
that the assertion of tribal sovereignty arose in the context of a land 
claim.308  
The same concerns about disruption that animated Sherrill do not apply 
to litigation over treaty rights. In the reservation diminishment context, the 
Court has already incorporated these concerns into the third factor of the 
                                                                                                                 
 303. See Osage Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 
1265-66 (N.D. Okla. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
 304. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Village of Hobart and Pender Public Schools in 
Support of Petitioners, supra note 297, at 21-24. 
 305. See Brief of Oklahoma Farm Bureau, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance, supra note 239, at 23. 
 306. See Brief of the Appellees at 55-56, Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (No. 09-5050) (arguing that 
the assertion of tribal sovereignty at issue was more disruptive than in Sherrill because the 
reservation covered 1.5 million acres; only 3.5% of the population were tribal members; 
85% of the land was unrestricted; the state and county had long exercised criminal 
jurisdiction, including over crimes involving tribal members, and had provided social 
services to the entire population; and the Tribe did not seek to exercise jurisdiction over fee 
land and nonmembers until 2004). 
 307. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee Director of Ohio Department of Natural 
Resources, supra note 239, at 30 (“[B]ecause [Sherrill] turned on the nature of the relief 
sought (equitable) and the fact that the relief sought would disrupt the sovereignty of the 
State, her counties, and subdivisions, the applicability of these defenses is not limited solely 
to land claims. Instead, the Court’s reasoning in Sherrill applies to any attempt . . . to seek 
equitable relief that disrupts settled expectations and the sovereignty of the State . . . .”). 
 308. See supra text accompanying notes 242-49. 
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Solem test, which requires consideration of “the subsequent demographic 
history of opened lands.”309 Under this factor, courts analyze the Indian 
population and history of state and tribal jurisdiction.310 Further, courts 
consider non-Indian justifiable expectations and the burdens that 
recognizing tribal sovereignty would have on state and local 
governments.311 Allowing litigants to rely on the third Solem factor to argue 
for reservation diminishment and then raise Sherrill at the remedial stage 
would permit two bites at the same apple. 
True, a finding of diminishment cannot rest on the third Solem factor 
alone.312 However, this reflects the fact that non-Indian expectations are 
often not justified in the reservation diminishment context. Non-Indian 
settlers knew they were moving into areas with checkerboard jurisdiction 
caused by congressional opening of the reservation; in Sherrill, only the 
OIN lawsuit threatened to create a checkerboard of tribal and state 
sovereignty.313 Relatedly, although the land transfers underlying Sherrill 
were unlawful, New York, its municipalities, and its population reasonably 
                                                                                                                 
 309. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1081 (2016). 
 310. Compare South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356-57 (1998) 
(recognizing as factors supporting diminishment that Indians owned less than 10% of the 
land at issue, over two-thirds of the population was non-Indian, the land included several 
municipalities incorporated under state law, the State had exercised jurisdiction over the land 
since 1894, and the Tribe only recently attempted to assert jurisdiction over nontrust land), 
with Solem, 465 U.S. at 479-80 (supporting its finding that the reservation was not 
diminished with evidence that tribal authorities and the federal government exercised 
jurisdiction in the area, the population was half Indian, and the seat of the tribal government 
was on the land at issue). 
 311. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420-21 (1994) (finding the reservation diminished 
in part because reaffirming that predominately non-Indian land was part of a reservation 
would “seriously burden[] the administration of state and local governments” and would 
“seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area” (quoting 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471)); cf. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: 
The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 20-
21, 25-26 (1999) (arguing that a desire to protect non-Indian justifiable expectations 
animates the Court’s reservation diminishment doctrine and that the doctrine only makes 
sense as a way to determine when a reservation has lost its Indian character). 
 312. See Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1081-82 (acknowledging that “th[e] Court has never relied 
solely on this third consideration to find diminishment” and that justifiable “expectations 
alone, resulting from the Tribe’s failure to assert jurisdiction, cannot diminish reservation 
boundaries”); Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 356 (referring to the third factor as “the least 
compelling”). 
 313. For this reason, the Sherrill Court repeatedly referred to the OIN’s assertion of 
sovereignty as “unilateral.” City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203, 219-
21 (2005).  
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believed that these transfers and the removal of the Oneidas had substituted 
the state sovereign for the tribal sovereign.314 This was especially true given 
the federal government’s acquiescence to and assistance in the Oneidas’ 
removal.315 In stark contrast, where Congress opened a reservation to non-
Indian settlement without diminishing it, the settlers and their successors 
never had justifiable expectations that there was no tribal sovereign because 
tribal members always remained in the area.316 The non-Indian population 
cannot develop these justifiable expectations that support restricting tribal 
sovereignty simply by choosing to ignore the presence of the tribal 
sovereign.317  
Applying Sherrill in this context would also contradict Congress’s view 
that tribal sovereignty in Indian Country is not overly disruptive. The Indian 
Country statute delineates land over which tribes and the federal 
government have primary civil and criminal jurisdiction.318 As noted above, 
Sherrill seems to require an all-or-nothing analysis that assumes tribes 
would exercise sovereignty in a disruptive manner and then bars tribes from 
exercising that sovereignty in any capacity.319 Utilizing such an approach in 
reservation diminishment cases would deny tribes the ability to govern 
much of Indian Country, which would contravene congressional intent in 
                                                                                                                 
 314. See id. at 216. 
 315. See id. at 214. 
 316. Where Congress did intend to diminish a reservation, expectations about the 
absence of the tribal sovereign are more justified, which is why the third Solem factor can 
only augment more direct evidence of congressional intent. Furthermore, the fact that tribes 
generally have been consistently present on the reservation in diminishment cases 
demonstrates another fundamental difference with Sherrill. In Sherrill, the underlying claim 
undeniably accrued at the time of the unlawful land transfers. But it is difficult to say when 
reservation diminishment claims accrue: Does the tribe have one claim that arose when the 
state or local government first exercised on-reservation jurisdiction? Or does the tribal claim 
reaccrue each time the state or local government exercises jurisdiction on the reservation?  
 317. A similar analysis demonstrates that concerns about non-Indian settled expectations 
are also irrelevant in cases like Shinnecock, where the Tribe sought to build a casino on 
lands to which it alleged it retained aboriginal title outside of any treaty. See supra text 
accompanying notes 163-67. The tribal sovereign and checkerboarding jurisdiction were 
always present, and the state cannot develop justifiable expectations by selectively ignoring 
the presence of the tribal sovereign. 
 318. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 
U.S. 520, 527 & n.1 (1998). 
 319. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.  
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the Indian Country statute to permit tribes to exercise sovereignty on their 
reservations.320  
Moreover, the argument for applying Sherrill to reservation 
diminishment cases overstates the negative consequences of reaffirming 
reservations. Tribal governments have no criminal jurisdiction and only 
limited civil jurisdiction over non-Indians;321 as Justice Sotomayor 
acknowledged at the Parker oral argument, these limits protect non-Indians 
on reservations from significant disruption at the hands of tribal 
governments.322 State and local governments are not powerless to regulate 
                                                                                                                 
 320. Of course, this argument applies to the dispute in Sherrill as well: The Court 
interfered with congressional intent by extinguishing the OIN’s sovereignty on land it 
acknowledged was Indian Country. See Jennifer R. Sunderlin, Note, One Nation, Indivisible: 
American “Indian Country” in the Wake of City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 70 
ALB. L. REV. 1563, 1566 (2007). This is one of many reasons that Sherrill’s all-or-nothing 
approach does not withstand scrutiny. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 86, at 550 (criticizing the 
Court for this aspect of its opinion). This mode of analysis is also incompatible with the 
case-specific approach courts use to evaluate tribal sovereignty disputes, see, e.g., Strate v. 
A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997), and unnecessary because the Court has so 
restricted tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers that protecting non-Indian expectations only 
requires courts to step in under specific circumstances that threaten severe disruption, cf. 
Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 226 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for its “greatly 
exaggerated” fear of “opening a Pandora’s box of tribal powers” that ignored state authority 
on tribal lands and the limited power of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers). In 
addition, this approach incorrectly assumes that all exercises of tribal sovereignty are equally 
disruptive to non-Indian expectations and state and local governments. For example, tax 
immunity is fundamentally the same as a damages award in that it simply denies the 
government revenue; unless the land at issue covers a significant portion of the municipality, 
the disruption would be minimal. See, e.g., Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 
16. Exemptions from local zoning laws may be quite disruptive, but their effects depend on 
the area’s population density and traffic patterns. Disruption to “innocent” landowners seems 
more troubling than disruption to the state government, especially when that government 
committed an unlawful act by dispossessing tribes of their land. A full analysis of how the 
Court should reframe its disruption analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but it should 
consider a sliding-scale approach that asks, based on evidence from the parties like those in 
Shinnecock, see supra text accompanying note 163, how disruptive the assertion of 
sovereignty would be and whom it primarily would affect.  
 321. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 329-
30, 341 (2008) (delineating limited circumstances under which tribes can exercise civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 
(1978) (holding that tribes cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians). 
 322. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 240, at 9 (questioning Nebraska on the 
effects of finding the reservation undiminished given the Tribe’s limited powers on its 
reservation). 
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conduct on reservations.323 Outside of the Indian context, some federal 
facilities create checkerboards of jurisdiction with state authority, but post 
offices, for example, do not create lawless areas that prevent state and local 
governments from regulating their residents effectively.324 Adding a third 
sovereign on reservations does not make the situation any more 
problematic.325 Additionally, the risk that reservations would become 
lawless regions threatening the welfare of non-Indians is overblown. Tribal 
members, no less than non-Indians, want emergency services, good schools, 
environmental protections, and more from their governments. Tribal 
members are just as unlikely to accept the widespread lawlessness and 
excessive development that concern non-Indian litigants in these cases. 
Tribes have incentives to protect non-Indians on their reservations and 
cooperate with state and local governments: If they do not, displeased non-
Indians can petition Congress to eliminate their sovereignty completely.  
By contrast, allowing Sherrill to bar tribes from exercising sovereignty 
over their reservations would harm Indians and non-Indians alike. Indian 
and non-Indian defendants would challenge tribal and federal criminal 
jurisdiction, respectively, by arguing that demographic shifts created 
“justifiable” expectations that the land where their crimes took place was no 
longer Indian Country.326 Throwing the already complicated division of 
criminal jurisdiction on reservations into more chaos would be dangerous. 
Applying Sherrill in this context would encourage conflict between tribes 
and non-Indian populations. So as not to appear to relinquish sovereignty, 
tribes would have a strong incentive to avoid cooperative services 
agreements with state and local governments and keep non-Indians off their 
                                                                                                                 
 323. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) 
(permitting state taxation of reservation activity when the tribal, state, and federal interests 
suggest that federal law does not preempt the tax). Given the Tribe’s limited powers over 
nonmembers and the ability of the state to regulate some behavior on the reservation, 
applying Sherrill in this context would actually give states three bites at the apple: the 
Montana or preemption analysis; the Solem test; and the Sherrill analysis. 
 324. Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Village of Hobart, 732 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that checkerboarding jurisdiction is “a familiar feature of American government,” 
including with post offices and military bases). 
 325. It is also rather unfair to justify restricting tribal sovereignty by citing the harms of 
alternating state and tribal jurisdiction when that checkerboarding is not inherent to a 
reservation but is instead the result of the Court’s restrictions on tribal power in Indian 
Country. See Singer, supra note 23, at 609. 
 326. See Brief for Historical and Legal Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 33, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406), 2015 WL 
9412675. 
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reservations.327 Likewise, state and local governments would try to exercise 
more jurisdiction in Indian Country to create justifiable expectations against 
tribal sovereignty.328 Litigation over jurisdiction would soar, as many state 
and local governments would immediately initiate new reservation 
diminishment claims. 
For similar reasons, Sherrill’s concerns about non-Indian justifiable 
expectations should not apply to the remedial phase in the context of tribal 
hunting and fishing rights. The notion that non-Indians can develop 
justifiable expectations in the denial of tribal treaty rights that require courts 
to continue to deny those rights is strange in light of the status of Indian 
treaties as federal law.329 Sherrill held that a particular remedy in a specific 
lawsuit would be disruptive; extrapolating from that reasoning to argue that 
enforcing federal law, in the form of Indian treaty rights, would be 
disruptive is radical. Yet that is precisely what non-Indians seeking to rely 
on their expectations to deny tribal treaty rights must argue. Permitting this 
sort of reasoning would permit back-door judicial abrogation of treaty 
rights, which the Court has repeatedly foreclosed.330 
Courts can also distinguish hunting and fishing treaty rights disputes 
from Sherrill on a more practical level. In many treaty rights cases, tribes 
did not fail to assert their treaty rights to the same extent that the OIN 
delayed bringing suit in Sherrill.331 More significantly, the risk of 
disruption in this context is not substantial. In finding that laches barred a 
tribe from exercising hunting rights, for example, the district court in 
Ottawa Tribe had three primary concerns: safety risks to recreational land 
users, lower state revenue from fewer visitors to public lands, and harm to 
                                                                                                                 
 327. Courts should also consider cooperative agreements when analyzing disruption 
under Sherrill. The court in Shinnecock thought the agreement of the Tribe to follow state 
environmental laws in building its casino irrelevant because it could choose to violate those 
laws if the court affirmed its sovereignty. See supra text accompanying note 167. By 
ignoring tribal attempts to lessen the impact of their activities on the surrounding area, this 
approach disincentivizes tribes from entering into cooperative agreements, which would 
only cause more disruption to non-Indians. 
 328. Cf. Krakoff, A Regretful Postscript, supra note 11, at 6. 
 329. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”); Antoine v. 
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 204 (1975) (noting that Indian treaties and congressionally 
ratified agreements are “the supreme law of the land”). 
 330. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.  
 331. See United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 968 (9th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing 
a fishing rights dispute from Sherrill by noting that, unlike in Sherrill, the Tribe did not 
relinquish its treaty rights), aff’d by an equally divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018).  
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conservation efforts.332 None of these concerns merits barring tribes from 
exercising their treaty rights. Tribes have incentives to stop unsafe hunting 
or fishing practices to avoid criminal prosecution and maintain good 
relations with neighbors. Given the tribes’ use of these safe practices, 
visitors would continue to utilize the lands. Tribes and states would likely 
enter into compacts to restrict where tribes could exercise their treaty rights, 
further protecting states’ interests. States have significant power to regulate 
the exercise of tribal hunting and fishing treaty rights to protect 
conservation efforts.333 Thus, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “an 
Indian tribe’s treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on state land are not 
irreconcilable with a State’s sovereignty over [its] natural resources.”334 
2. Sovereign Immunity 
Unlike the confusion over sovereign treaty rights, the developing 
consensus on tribal sovereign immunity is correct: Sherrill had no effect on 
tribal sovereign immunity doctrine.335 Focused on the availability of a 
specific remedy in the OIN land claim, Sherrill said nothing about 
sovereign immunity at all. The Court made the OIN’s land taxable, but it 
did not discuss how state and local governments could enforce their taxes. 
Rather than referring to sovereign immunity, the Court’s ambiguous 
statement that the “equitable cast of the relief sought remains the same 
whether asserted affirmatively or defensively” more plausibly prohibits the 
tribe from asserting its sovereign authority and associated tax immunity in 
foreclosure proceedings.336 Sherrill did not address other defenses, such as 
sovereign immunity, that could bar methods of tax collection.337 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                 
 332. See Ottawa Tribe v. Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Res., 541 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 (N.D. Ohio 
2008), aff’d on other grounds, 577 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009). The court in this section of its 
opinion was discussing tribal hunting rights, but similar arguments would apply to fishing 
rights.  
 333. See Antoine, 420 U.S. at 207 (noting that states can regulate tribal hunting and 
fishing as long as the regulation does not discriminate against Indians and is “a reasonable 
and necessary conservation measure” and “its application to the Indians is necessary in the 
interest of conservation”). Although this standard arose in the context of a particular treaty 
with a Washington tribe, see Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968), 
the Supreme Court and others have applied it more generally, see, e.g., Antoine, 420 U.S. at 
207; United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 334. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999).  
 335. See supra Section II.B.4. 
 336. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24. 
 337. Cf. Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 228-30, 232 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated as moot and remanded, 562 
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the Court’s statement that “the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient 
sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue” concerned 
sovereign authority, not sovereign immunity.338 Finally, the concern in 
Sherrill about potential disruption from certain remedies does not fit in 
analyses of sovereign immunity, which serves to bar, rather than grant, 
remedies. 
Courts finding that Sherrill can abrogate tribal sovereign immunity have 
argued that a contrary result would undermine the decision by leaving state 
and local governments no way to enforce their laws.339 At its core, this 
argument supports jettisoning sovereign immunity altogether, whether for 
tribes or other sovereigns.340 Any assertion of sovereign immunity bars a 
remedy despite the existence of a right.341 It is also something our laws 
regularly allow: When a court grants a government official qualified 
immunity in a constitutional tort suit, for example, the plaintiff cannot 
recover a remedy despite a constitutional violation.342 Sherrill itself makes 
clear that rights and remedies do not always go together by recognizing the 
distinction between the two. The decision provides no reason to question 
the Court’s general sovereign immunity doctrine.  
In fact, the Court has only broadened sovereign immunity law in the past 
two decades.343 Under current doctrine, tribes as sovereigns are entitled to 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 42 (2011) (per curiam) (finding that Sherrill did not permit foreclosure of the OIN land 
because the Nonintercourse Act forbids alienation of Indian land without congressional 
approval and that the footnote in Sherrill “does not address the issue of alienability” but 
“merely suggests that the [OIN] is foreclosed from asserting immunity from taxes as a 
defense”). 
 338. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 (2005). 
 339. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26. 
 340. Cf. Brief for the Petitioners at 27-30, Madison County, 562 U.S. 42 (2005) (No. 10-
72) (expressing skepticism of the doctrine’s origins and viability in support of the argument 
that Sherrill bars tribes from asserting sovereign immunity in foreclosure proceedings). 
 341. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998) (“There is a 
difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the means available 
to enforce them.”). 
 342. See Madison County, 605 F.3d at 159 n.8 (giving qualified immunity as an example 
of how our legal system denies remedies in certain instances where the defendant has 
committed a wrong).  
 343. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 831-32 (2014) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s expansive view of both tribal and state sovereign 
immunity). 
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sovereign immunity344 that, like state and foreign sovereign immunity, does 
not depend on geography.345 Due to the complex policy considerations at 
issue, only Congress, not the courts, has authority to create exceptions to 
tribal sovereign immunity.346 Even when the tribe is subject to state law, the 
state cannot force compliance via direct suit.347 Significantly, although 
tribal sovereign immunity has generated controversy among the justices,348 
the Court reaffirmed these core tenets in 2014, nine years after Sherrill.349 
These tenets demonstrate why courts should not read Sherrill to alter 
tribal sovereign immunity. Surely the Court, after repeatedly reaffirming a 
broad understanding of sovereign immunity, did not revoke it without any 
mention it was doing so, especially in a case like Sherrill that rested on 
precisely the type of policy balancing the Court has left to Congress. 
Furthermore, reading Sherrill to say that tribes do not have sovereign 
immunity for disputes concerning land on which they cannot exercise 
sovereign authority would be tantamount to finding that the Court impliedly 
overruled the principle that tribal sovereign immunity applies to off-
                                                                                                                 
 344. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 
476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is 
a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”). 
 345. See, e.g., Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 790 (stating that tribal sovereign immunity applies 
to “suits arising from a tribe’s commercial activities, even when they take place off Indian 
lands”). The Court has discussed sovereign immunity as emerging from tribal sovereign 
authority over territory, but only to explain why tribes, and not private landowners, enjoy 
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 
498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). If this was not completely clear in Potawatomi, the Court’s 
holdings in Kiowa and Bay Mills that tribes are entitled to sovereign immunity even for off-
reservation activities make it unarguable.  
 346. See, e.g., Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 800-01 (recognizing that “it is fundamentally 
Congress’s job, not [the Court’s], to determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity” 
because “Congress . . . has the greater capacity ‘to weigh and accommodate the competing 
policy concerns and reliance interests’ involved.” (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 759)).  
 347. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755 (“To say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation 
conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit.”); see also 
Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 513-14 (holding that, while the Tribe had a duty to collect state 
taxes on cigarette sales to nonmembers at its convenience store, the state could not sue the 
Tribe directly to collect the taxes or require it to collect taxes from buyers in the future).  
 348. See, e.g., Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 814 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing with three 
other justices that sovereign immunity should not “bar suits arising out of an Indian tribe’s 
commercial activities conducted outside its territory”); Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity is founded upon an 
anachronistic fiction. In my opinion all Governments—federal, state, and tribal—should 
generally be accountable for their illegal conduct.” (citation omitted)). 
 349. See Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788-90, 797-803. 
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reservation activities. Given the disentangling of sovereign immunity from 
land status, the ability to exercise sovereignty over the land at issue is 
simply not a prerequisite for asserting sovereign immunity.350 Any force 
these arguments may have had evaporated when the Court reiterated these 
principles with no mention of Sherrill in the 2014 Bay Mills decision.351  
Conclusion 
This Article serves two purposes. First, it demonstrates that Sherrill has 
sown confusion in the lower courts over how to apply its concerns about 
disruption to non-Indian justifiable expectations. The Court pulled together 
a new doctrine from themes and principles of established doctrines but 
failed to provide guidance on when this new doctrine would apply. Lower 
courts are therefore in conflict over Sherrill’s relevance. For example, over 
strong dissents, the Second Circuit has applied Sherrill to create an inherent 
disruption rule that bars all tribal land claims regardless of remedy. Courts 
are split on whether and how Sherrill applies to reservation diminishment 
and other treaty rights disputes or assertions of tribal sovereign immunity. 
Although percolation of ideas among the lower courts can be positive, this 
confusion creates substantial risk for tribes in litigation: If a tribe is 
assigned to a judge with a broad understanding of Sherrill and its concerns 
about disruption to non-Indian justifiable expectations, it risks losing its suit 
despite strong arguments based on traditional doctrine.  
In addition, this Article closely analyzes Sherrill to develop a faithful 
interpretation that can inform attempts to apply the decision to new facts. 
Sherrill was the Court’s response to a unique prospective remedy in a land 
claim litigation seeking to permit a tribe to exercise its sovereignty after 
                                                                                                                 
 350. Both Madison County and New York made this argument in the OIN litigation. See 
Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants at 61, Oneida 
Indian Nation v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-6408-cv(L)), 2007 
WL 6432637; Brief of Amicus Curiae State of New York in Support of Defendants-
Counterclaimants-Appellants Madison County and Oneida County Seeking Reversal at 10, 
Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-6408-cv(L)), 
2007 WL 6432640. 
 351. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca County, 761 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam) (recognizing that Bay Mills provided “further guidance regarding both the 
continuing vitality of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit and the propriety of 
drawing distinctions that might constrain the broad sweep of that immunity in the absence of 
express action by Congress.”). The Court’s reaffirmance in Bay Mills that tribal sovereign 
immunity is broader than tribal sovereign authority also undermines the argument that 
Kiowa said that the two were not coextensive only in dicta. See, e.g., New York v. 
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133, 155-56 (2d. Cir. 2012) (Hall, J., dissenting). 
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two centuries. This understanding explains why lower courts should not 
import Sherrill’s equitable concerns about disruption to non-Indian 
justifiable expectations into every dispute involving Indian tribes. The 
Second Circuit’s inherent disruption rule, for example, ignores Sherrill’s 
focus on only prospective, disruptive remedies and its reaffirmation of 
Oneida II. Courts applying Sherrill to tribal sovereignty and treaty disputes 
have failed to consider that the decision does not fit within those established 
doctrines and evinces significantly different concerns about disruption than 
those at issue in these types of disputes. 
Although courts should not apply Sherrill beyond prospective remedies 
in tribal land claim litigation on doctrinal grounds, the worst consequence 
of a broad understanding of Sherrill is not muddled doctrine. Resolution of 
disputes between tribes and non-Indians through litigation inevitably leads 
to a contentious relationship where both sides seek to “win” completely. An 
unjustifiably broad understanding of Sherrill would accelerate this litigious 
approach. Knowing they could pull out concerns about disruption to non-
Indian expectations to defeat a wide range of tribal rights, state and local 
governments would exert even more sovereign authority in Indian Country. 
States and local governments would, along with non-Indian private parties, 
pursue more litigation against tribes. 
This litigious approach makes much less likely the optimal solution to 
these types of disputes: a negotiated settlement between the parties.352 Such 
a resolution has special importance in federal Indian law. Disputes between 
tribes and non-Indians float above a sea of complex policy and moral issues 
concerning the destruction and subjugation of Indian tribes for over four 
centuries.353 These issues defy simple solutions; as a society, we will 
probably never satisfactorily resolve them. Encouraging tribes and non-
Indians to resolve their conflicts through negotiated settlements not only 
allows both sides to “win,” but also helps society take baby steps in coming 
to terms with these underlying policy and moral questions. An overly broad 
                                                                                                                 
 352. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 n.3 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that a settlement between the parties would “be the best final 
result”), aff’d, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010), vacated as moot and remanded, 562 U.S. 42 
(2011) (per curiam); Fletcher, supra note 117, at 103 (arguing that the ideal resolution of 
tribal-state disputes is a negotiated settlement that harmonizes tribal and state interests, such 
as incorporation of the reservation into local zoning plans, sharing of gaming revenue, or 
cross-deputization of law enforcement). 
 353. See, e.g., Can. St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, No. 5:82-CV-0783, 
2013 WL 3992830, at *16 n.27 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013) (noting that the “historical 
injustice” in the tribal land claim might not be just the unlawful land transfer but also “the 
ongoing oppression or mistreatment of native peoples by state and local governments”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/8
No. 1] SPECIAL FEATURE 305 
 
 
application of Sherrill does the opposite by giving non-Indians a guaranteed 
win that allows courts to paper over these questions.  
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